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#### Obama pushing immigration reform first even with fiscal issues and it will pass – GOP electoral incentives and Hastert rule circumvention

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D.C. She previously worked at The Washington Independent., “Obama's Immigration Reform Push To Begin This Month” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/02/obama-immigration-reform_n_2398507.html>)

WASHINGTON -- Despite a bruising fiscal cliff battle that managed to set the stage for an even more heated showdown that will likely take place in a matter of months, President Barack Obama is planning to move full steam ahead with the rest of his domestic policy agenda. An Obama administration official said the president plans to push for immigration reform this January. The official, who spoke about legislative plans only on condition of anonymity, said that coming standoffs over deficit reduction are unlikely to drain momentum from other priorities. The White House plans to push forward quickly, not just on immigration reform but gun control laws as well. The timeframe is likely to be cheered by Democrats and immigration reform advocates alike, who have privately expressed fears that Obama's second term will be drowned out in seemingly unending showdowns between parties. The just-completed fiscal cliff deal is giving way to a two-month deadline to resolve delayed sequestration cuts, an expiring continuing resolution to fund the government and a debt ceiling that will soon be hit. With those bitter battles ahead, the possibility of passing other complicated legislation would seem diminished. "The negative effect of this fiscal cliff fiasco is that every time we become engaged in one of these fights, there's no oxygen for anything else," said a Senate Democratic aide, who asked for anonymity to speak candidly. "It's not like you can be multi-tasking -- with something like this, Congress just comes to a complete standstill." It remains unclear what type of immigration policies the White House plans to push in January, but turning them into law could be a long process. Aides expect it will take about two months to write a bipartisan bill, then another few months before it goes up for a vote, possibly in June. A bipartisan group of senators are already working on a deal, although they are still in the early stages. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) will likely lead on the Democratic side in the House. While many Republicans have expressed interest in piecemeal reform, it's still unclear which of them plan to join the push. Lofgren expressed hope that immigration reform would be able to get past partisan gridlock, arguing that the election was seen as something of a mandate for fixing the immigration system and Republicans won't be able to forget their post-election promises to work on a bill. "In the end, immigration reform is going to depend very much on whether Speaker [John] Boehner wants to do it or not," Lofgren said. Advocates have vowed to keep pushing for reform. As part of their efforts, they plan to remind Republican members of Congress about their presidential nominee's defeat among Latino and Asian voters, a majority of whom support a fix to the immigration system. "They can procrastinate as long as they want, but they're going to have a serious day of reckoning next election cycle," said Angela Kelley, vice president for immigration policy and advocacy at the Center for American Progress. "We're going to have a lot of near-death experiences with this issue, but I'm pretty confident it's never going to go completely to a flatline." Good news for immigration advocates may have come Tuesday night, when Boehner broke the so-called "Hastert Rule" and allowed the fiscal cliff bill to come for a vote without support from a majority of his Republican conference. Given opposition to immigration reform by many Tea Party Republicans, the proof that Boehner is willing to bypass them on major legislation is a good sign, the Democratic aide said. "If something is of such importance that the GOP establishment [is] telling Boehner, 'You must do this. You need to get this off the table soon,'" the Democratic aide said, the speaker could break the Hastert Rule again. "He already did it with this fiscal issue, so I would not be surprised if when it came down to it he puts up a bill that he just allows to go through with a combination of Democratic and Republican votes, without worrying about a majority of the majority," the aide continued. Frank Sharry, executive director of the pro-immigration reform group America's Voice, also said he thinks the House could pass an immigration bill in the same way it did last night, relying on support from both parties. He's hopeful that the fiscal cliff fight could even make them happy to work out legislation in a more standard way. "I never thought I'd say this, but after bruising battles over the future of the American and world economy, the chance to legislate through regular order on immigration reform might have leaders in both parties working together and singing 'Kumbaya,'" Sharry said.

#### Green lobbies hate the plan

Investors.com 6/26/12 (“Will President Obama's Re-election Doom Fracking?” <http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/062612-616210-epa-proposes-new-shale-fracking-rules.htm?p=full>)

So desperate have the greenies become to stop the oil and natural gas boom produced by the use of fracking that they resorted to claims that fracking can cause earthquakes. A recent report by the National Research Council dispelled that notion. U.S. Geological Survey seismologist William Ellsworth says he agrees with the research council that "hydraulic fracturing does not seem to pose much risk for earthquake activity."

#### They’re key to the agenda and Obama’s political capital Roberts 4/3/12 (James M., staffwriter, “ROBERTS: Obama’s ‘green’ policies punish the poor” <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/3/obamas-green-policies-punish-the-poor/>)

The environmental movement has flexed its lobbying might through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for decades. But never has it been more muscular than under the current administration. The green lobby’s influence has been the stuff of headlines in recent months. Even as gasoline prices soared, it persuaded President Obama to block the Keystone XL pipeline, which would have brought Canadian oil to Texas refineries. And starting with the Solyndra debacle, there’s been a steady stream of stories about the lobby’s success in finagling billions of dollars in federal loans for green-energy companies that just keep going belly-up. But the greens exert far more clout than even these examples suggest. When it comes to U.S. international development and trade policies, the greens don’t just influence decisions, they actually run the show.

#### Obama’s political capital is key to reform passage

Dade 12/7/12 (Corey, staffwriter for NPR, “Black, Latino Groups: It's Our Turn, Mr. President” <http://www.npr.org/2012/12/05/166573082/black-latino-groups-its-our-turn-mr-president>)

Spending 'Political Capital' For Latinos, the November election has sparked momentum for their top issue, immigration. Congressional Republicans have since embraced immigration reform as a priority. Bipartisan talks are under way in the House on legislation that could be introduced early next year. Obama has said Congress should "seize the moment," yet Latino leaders insist that voters have given the president a mandate to lead the effort. Some Latino leaders believe Obama should have fought more aggressively to push the DREAM Act through Congress in 2010. (The bill would have established a path to citizenship for young people brought to the United States as children who attend college or serve in the military.) Latinos also criticized the Obama administration, before it changed its policy, for deporting a record 1.1 million people in three years. "Not only the president but others have said in the past, 'How much political capital do we need to spend on this issue?' Everybody understands now that you need to spend all of it," says Rep. Luis Gutierrez, D-Ill. "With the same vigor and energy that Latino people voted for this president, he should do this."

#### Comprehensive immigration reform is key to the economy and highly skilled workers

Farrell 12/13/12 (Chris, a contributing editor for Bloomberg Businessweek. From 1986-97, he was on the magazine's staff, as a corporate finance staff and department editor and then as an economics editor. Farrell wrote Right on the Money: Taking Control of Your Personal Finances and Deflation: What Happens When Prices Fall? Among Farrell's many awards are a National Magazine Award, two Loeb Awards, and the Edward R. Murrow Award. Farrell is a graduate of the London School of Economics and Stanford University. “Obama’s Next Act: Immigration Reform” <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-12-13/obamas-next-act-immigration-reform>)

Washington won’t get much of a reprieve from verbal pyrotechnics once the drama of the fiscal cliff is over. Up next: major immigration reform. President Obama has made it clear that a comprehensive overhaul of the nation’s badly frayed immigration system is a second-term priority. Many Republican lawmakers are convinced the big takeaway from the 2012 election results is that conservatives need to rethink their hard-line stance on immigration—including illegal immigrants. Here’s what Washington should do before tackling the tough job of rewriting the immigration laws: Create a quicksilver path to citizenship for the 11 million to 12 million undocumented workers in the U.S. (excluding the small number convicted of violent crimes or multiple felonies). The shift in status acknowledges that these foreign-born newcomers, like previous generations of immigrants, overcame significant obstacles to come to the U.S. to make a better life for their families. Illegal immigrants are neighbors heading off to work, sending their kids to school, and attending church. Their everyday lives would vastly improve by moving from the shadows of society into the mainstream. More important from a public-policy perspective, the change would give a boost to the economy’s underlying dynamism. “What you’re doing in the short run is making it easier for workers to move between jobs, a relatively small effect,” says Gordon Hanson, a professor of economics at the University of California at San Diego. “The larger effect from eliminating uncertainty for these immigrants is creating incentives for them to make long-term investments in careers, entrepreneurship, education, homes, and community.” Let’s state the obvious: A rapid transformation of illegal immigrants into legal immigrants isn’t in the cards. Amnesty—let alone citizenship—is an anathema to large parts of the electorate. Too bad, since the scholarly evidence is compelling that immigrants—documented or not, legal or illegal—are a boon to the net economy. “Competition fosters economic growth,” says Michael Clemens, senior fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington. The economic return from attracting skilled immigrants to the U.S. is well known. Foreign-born newcomers account for some 13 percent of the population, yet they are responsible for one-third of U.S. patented innovations. The nation’s high-tech regions such as Silicon Valley, the Silicon Hills of Austin, Tex., and Boston’s Route 128 rely on immigrant scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs, and employees. Better yet, economist Enrico Moretti at the University of California at Berkeley calculates that a 1 percent increase in the share of college-educated immigrants in a city hikes productivity and wages for others in the city. Less appreciated is how much the economy gains from the efforts of less-skilled immigrants, including illegal workers. Throughout the country, foreign-born newcomers have revived beaten-down neighborhoods as immigrant entrepreneurs have opened small businesses and immigrant families have put down stakes. Immigrant workers have played a vital role keeping a number of industries competitive, such as agriculture and meatpacking. Cities with lots of immigrants have seen their per capita tax base go up, according to David Card, an economist at UC Berkeley. Despite the popular impression that a rising tide of immigrants is associated with higher crime rates, research by Robert Sampson of Harvard University and others offer a compelling case that it’s no coincidence that the growing ranks of immigrants tracks the reduction in crime in the U.S. But don’t newcomers—legal and illegal—drive down wages and job opportunities for American workers? Not really. A cottage industry of economic studies doesn’t find any negative effect on native-born wages and employment on the local level. On the national level the research shows the impact on native-born Americans doesn’t drift far from zero, either positively or negatively. “In both cases, immigrants are more likely to complement the job prospects of U.S.-born citizens than they are to compete for the same jobs as U.S.-born citizens,” Giovanni Peri, an economist at the University of California at Davis, writes in Rationalizing U.S. Immigration Policy: Reforms for Simplicity, Fairness, and Economic Growth. The counterintuitive results reflect a numbers of factors. Immigrants expand the size of the economic pie by creating new businesses, new jobs, and new consumers. Middle-class families find it easier to focus on careers with affordable immigrant labor offering gardening, child care, and other services. Many illegal immigrants aren’t fluent in English, so they don’t compete for the same jobs as native-born workers. Another factor behind the lack of direct competition is the higher educational level of native-born Americans. In 1960 about half of U.S.-born working-age adults hadn’t completed high school, while the comparable figure today is about 8 percent. The real downside concern is on the fiscal side of the immigrant ledger. Yes, more taxes would go into Social Security, Medicare, and the like with legalization, but more people would qualify for Medicaid, welfare, and other benefits. At the local level, many school districts are strained financially from educating immigrant children, legal and illegal. That said, the prospect of fiscal costs would diminish as newly legalized immigrant workers move freely around the country seeking jobs, entrepreneurs are comfortable expanding their payrolls, and immigrant parents push their children to live the American Dream. “Over time, as entrepreneurs emerge and families are better able to get their kids through high school and college, you’re reducing the long-run fiscal claim of the group,” says Hanson. There is no economic evidence that making roughly 6 percent of the workforce illegal will benefit the economy. Plenty of research supports the opposite case. A fast track to legality offers Washington a rare twofer: a just move that’s economically efficient.

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#### ---Framing natural gas policy in terms of supply security externalizes our culpability for domestic consumption patterns collapsing the political & creating the conditions for nationalism, war and policy failure.

Lowth 2011

Colonel R. G., British Army, ‘Securitization’ and its effect on Strategic Thinking, SEAFORD HOUSE PAPER, Royal Defense Studies

Gas security has become synonymous with gas supply. Indeed the former has been established, and institutionalised, as the preferred term. Like Lakoff’s elephant, the connection between gas and security is today not only persistent, it is also irresistible. This conflation of security and supply has created, and through common usage perpetuates, a presumption that gas supply is intrinsically insecure, survival is at stake, special measures are necessary, and specific security actors are thereby empowered: When a particular [...] designation is accepted and taken for granted, something akin to a paradigm exists. When one paradigm and its adherents become the ultimate arbiter of “reality” in society, we say a hegemony of definition exists (Conrad and Schneider, 1992:181). Strategic thinking about gas supply has become security thinking. Formerly commercial and economic outcomes have been translated into security outcomes,30 sought in extremis by hard security or military means, often usurping compromises in other areas,31 and contradicting market fundamentals.32 Securitization of the gas market has also disrupted ‘consumer/producer’ or ‘customer/supplier’ relations, privileging instead ‘friend and foe’ (ie. opposition beyond mere competition): ‘while casting an issue as one of ‘security’ may help elevate its position on the political agenda, it also risks placing that issue within the logic of threat and decision, and potentially within the contrast of friend and enemy’ (Williams, 2003:523). One of the unintended consequences of this elevation, and shift in emphasis from the economic to the security spheres, has been to frustrate EU attempts to enhance its status, and collective bargaining power, as a gas consumer (the largest in the world). While, from as early as 2006, member states have supported in principle the notion of a common energy policy, many have been reluctant in practice to cede authority for security of gas supplies to the EU: ‘In [the economic domain] ... securitization is a way of taking economic nationalist positions in economic policy debates without having to abandon superficial commitments to the liberal consensus’ (Buzan et al, 1998: 115). So, despite their ‘communitarian rhetoric’ (Aliboni, 2008:4), member states – touched by the perceived threat of gas shortages – have chosen to act unilaterally to safeguard their own interests: ‘the broad consensus over the need for a more integrated energy policy ran parallel with EU member states’ reinforced trend to affirm their own national energy policies,’ (Natorski and Surrallés, 2008:72). Germany, for example, has struck bilateral agreements with Russia that include both long-term supply contracts and also the construction of North European Gas Pipeline (Nordstream) that will enhance Germany’s future gas security – but not necessarily serve the collective interests of the EU most effectively. In the south, where the EU is planning to construct its own Nabucco pipeline, Hungary and Italy have struck deals with Gazprom to build a South Stream pipeline in direct competition. Securitization has promoted self-interested or ‘narrow minded’ – and, in a community-sense, somewhat hypocritical – national thinking (Umbach, 2010:1239): ‘In [the economic domain] ... securitization is a way of taking economic nationalist positions in economic policy debates without having to abandon superficial commitments to the liberal consensus’ (Buzan et al, 1998: 115). In short, securitization has had a paradoxical effect on strategic thinking. While economic logic and EU competence favours collective EU action, the spectre of insecurity – understood and interpreted differently by individual states – has prevented the requisite solidarity and mobilization: ‘What unites the discourse of all member states is the emphasis on their competencies in determining their national strategies for security of supply ... [S]ecurity framing of energy is precisely what justified [member states’] reluctance to ... transfer competencies to the supranational level’ (ibid: 82,83). Externalization Securitization ‘externalizes’ strategic thinking about gas supplies in three interrelated ways: it establishes gas security as an intrinsically external problem; it prejudices cooperative relations with other gas stakeholders; and it introduces the prospect of reciprocal defensive strategies by other states, especially suppliers such as Russia, with unforeseeable consequences. Constructing gas supply as a security issue creates the perception that states are entitled to receive adequate gas, in the same way that they are entitled to enjoy national security (of which gas security is portrayed as an integral part). Any actual or potential shortfall in gas supply is therefore treated as if it were (rather than because it necessarily is) an existential threat. At the same time, in common with other threats to national security, the danger is deemed to exist outside. Self is threatened by other. The overall effect is powerful: the state is entitled to supplies of gas (akin, as well as contributing, to national security) and ‘they’, out there, are endangering those supplies. One of the consequences of conceptualising ‘gas for the EU’ as a security of supply issue, is that insecurity is thereby framed as something that is ‘done to’ the EU – a victim, threatened by aggressive producer/suppliers (Belyi, 2009). This externalization diverts thinking away from domestic aspects of the problem, and displaces potential internal solutions (which appear irrelevant compared with tackling the external threat). One of the principal and relentless critics of the EU’s securitization of gas supply, Pierre Noël, of the Cambridge Energy Policy Research Group, has argued continually in favour of internal EU market solutions to ensure adequate supplies of gas to member states.33 Successful securitization has, however, left little analytical space for his contention that ‘[economic rather than security] risks require that we let the markets work’ (Noel, 2008:1). His proposition forms the basis of a possible re-framing of energy security at the end of this section.

#### ---The impact is global resource wars and catastrophic accidents.

Byrne & Toly 2006

John, director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (CEEP) and Distinguished Professor of Public Policy at the University of Delaware, Noah, research associate and Ph.D. candidate in the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy at the University of Delaware, Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse, *Transforming Power: Energy, Environment and Society in Conflict*, pg

Among the most prominent techno-fixes for modern energy are those seeking to “green” the fossil fuels (see e.g., Jaccand, 2005). The substitution of natural gas for other hydrocarbons, the emergence of “clean coal,” the “ecologically sustainable” mining of what are supposed to be vast, untapped oil reserves in heretofore unfriendly terrains, 9 and the geological sequestration of climate-destabilizing CO2 emissions are among the most favored in this category. Each represents an effort to legitimate the conventional energy regime without displacing fossil fuel’s powerful role in rationalizing centralized energy production and distribution. Natural gas is said to provide efficiencies equal to, or exceeding, the other fossil fuels while generating far fewer environmentally harmful consequences; as a replacement for oil and coal, it would result in decreased acid rain, smog, and mercury pollution. Natural gas emits fewer pollutants—among them greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide. In this regard, it is advocated as an effective means by which to mitigate global warming. Low emissions of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter are also benefits of natural gas. Furthermore, the extraction, processing, and consumption of the fuel is said to produce very little solid waste and to have minimal impacts on water quality, unlike coal and oil (Cassedy and Grossman, 1998: 111 – 114). But while its environmental effects may merit consideration of natural gas as a transitional fuel, the social hazards of bringing this energy source to market are very real. Michael Klare has written of potential armed conflicts to control natural gas reserves and the attendant transportation infrastructure (Klare, 2002b). Bringing natural gas to market will inevitably involve expensive liquefaction of the gas—by cooling it to -259 degrees Fahrenheit (-162 degrees Celsius)—and transportation on potentially vulnerable supertanker ships. And concerns have risen regarding the safety of natural gas receiving terminals in an age of global terrorism (Testa, 2004). A recent study by researchers at Sandia National Laboratories examined the catastrophic potential of explosions, fires, and fireballs caused by ramming, triggered explosion, hijacking, or external terrorist actions such as attack by missile or plane (Hightower et al., 2004). Damage risked by potential explosion, either at a terminal or on a ship, is immense. There are currently five natural gas receiving terminals in the continental United States—one in the highly populated Boston metropolitan area. Forty more are proposed for North American coasts, with nineteen having already received regulatory approval despite the risks of terrorist attack (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (U.S.), 2005).

#### ---The alternative is to repoliticize energy politics; shifting the focus from perfecting structures of oppression to debating the desirability of existing energy structures in the first place.

Swyngedouw 2009

Erik, School of Environment and Development, Manchester University, The Antinomies of the Postpolitical City: In Search of a Democratic Politics of Environmental Production, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 33, Issue 3, pages 601–620

Live Earth concerts, waving the banner of climate change and urging the world's leaders to take immediate and serious action, were beamed across the airwaves from 8 major cities on 8 July 2007, watched by an estimated record number of 3 billion people. Cheered on by Al Gore and riding on the popular success of his unsettling ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ documentary, the concerts — exquisite expressions of contemporary spectacularized city life — re-enforced the consensual view that nature, the climate and the environment are in clear and present danger, threatening the life and sustainability of all the world's peoples, in particular the poorer ones, and whipping up a moral crusade for a more energy-selective and carbon-sparse code of socio-economic conduct. It is of course ironic that these concerts took the urban as their stage, while it is exactly the socio-metabolic functioning of cities that requires gigantic energy resources to sustain their socio-metabolic processes, while pumping an accelerating volume of CO2 into the atmosphere (Swyngedouw, 2006). Cities produce 80% of the world's greenhouse gases, express often the most pervasive forms of socio-environmental injustices and are central to producing more sustainable environmental futures (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; Sze, 2006; Doucet, 2007). Indeed, the environmental question has become one that mobilizes and galvanizes political energies, and around which a political consensus has emerged, one that has literally ‘naturalized the political’ (see Debruyne, 2007: 2). Indeed, a scientific consensus, most vividly illustrated by the successive Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports, fused with a pervasive apocalyptic imaginary, and combined with asserting the intrinsic value of a nature that has to be retro-fitted to regain a ‘sustainable’ configuration, has taken hold (Swyngedouw, 2007a). Environmental politics is a politics legitimated by a scientific consensus which, in turn, translates into a political consensus. The world is in clear and present danger and urgent, sustained and consensual action is required. This is a politics that ‘legitimizes itself by means of a direct reference to the scientific status of its knowledge’ (Žižek, 2006c: 188) or, in other words, it is a politics reduced to the administration and management of processes whose parameters are defined by consensual socio-scientific knowledges. This reduction of the political to the policing of environmental change, so I shall argue, evacuates if not forecloses the properly political and becomes part and parcel of the consolidation of a postpolitical and postdemocratic polity. The depoliticized contradictions of such postpolitical environmentalism exploded with acute force in 2008, when energy prices, and in particular oil, spiralled upwards to quadruple in a few months' time. Irrespective of the reasons behind this spectacular rise in oil prices (whether driven by extremely profitable financial speculation in the futures markets after the speculative land-bubble had imploded or by a combination of peak-oil conditions and rising demand of China and India, or a combination of both, remains disputed), the implications in terms of urban environmental justice became clear quickly. Hailed by some environmentalists as finally opening a window to bring oil consumption and greenhouse gas emissions down, poor people around the world suddenly saw food prices spiral out of reach, food crops replaced by bio-fuels, access to energy curtailed and the cost of moving around going up. While seemingly offering an opening towards a more sustainable postcarbon society, the contradictory effects rapidly came to the boil. Urban riots in Haiti, Mexico, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, China and elsewhere signalled that the environment is indeed a deeply political matter, one cut through by all manner of social antagonisms, radical disputes and profound disagreements. In recent years, urban research has become increasingly concerned with the social, political and economic implications of the techno-political and socio-scientific consensus that the present unsustainable and unjust environmental conditions require a transformation of the way urban life is organized. This special issue testifies to this concern and, in particular, to the socially highly uneven consequences of both the increasingly unsustainable environmental practices and the feeble attempts to ‘rectify’ the problem, to retrofit a nature that science suggests is out of synch with its own internal balancing act. A flurry of writing in recent years has begun to interrogate the close relationship between urban processes and environmental transformations (see Bickerstaff et al., 2009, this issue, for a review). Social environmental research has by now convincingly argued and demonstrated that physical-ecological processes are not independent from socio-economic and cultural processes. While such political and socio-ecological perspectives were originally primarily concerned with the degradation of ‘natural’ conditions (like soil erosion, deforestation, climate change or resource depletion), recent work has increasingly concentrated on the pivotal role of the urban in political ecological processes (see, e.g., Bell et al., 1998; Braun and Castree, 1998; Forsyth, 2002; Robbins, 2004; Castree, 2005; Heynen et al., 2005; 2007). Prompted by David Harvey's counter-intuitive comment that there is nothing unnatural about New York City, urban political ecologists insisted that urban environments, like any other socio-physical assemblage, are produced through combined social and ecological processes that shape particular socio-geographical conditions and manufacture the architecture of the socio-metabolic circulations and transformations that shape everyday urban life (Harvey, 1996). Neil Smith's (1984) ‘production of nature’ thesis has been expanded and reformulated in an attempt to let ecological processes re-enter our perspectives on nature and on the city (see, e.g., Gandy, 2003; Desfor and Keil, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2004; Kaika, 2005). In In the Nature of Cities, a range of urban political ecologists argued indeed that cities are produced socio-metabolic assemblages and their analyses insisted on the ‘produced’ character of urban environments, including the distribution of social roles and positions, the socio-ecological flows of materials and the metabolic re-working of socio-physical processes into the fabric of what is defined as a city (Heynen et al., 2005). In short, urban environmental conditions are seen as dynamic, socio-physical, power-laden and co-evolutionary1 constructions. Uneven consequences of socio-environmental change, the distribution of environmental ‘goods’ and ‘bads’, and the rhizomatic networks that relate local urban ecological transformations with distant socio-ecological processes are now commonly understood as combined social and physical entanglements. Political struggles are central in shaping alternative or different trajectories of socio-metabolic change and the construction of new and emancipatory urban environmental geographies. All manner of critical social-theoretical analyses have been mobilized to account for these processes. Marxist and post-Marxist perspectives, environmental justice arguments, deconstructionist and poststructural musings, science/technology studies, complexity theory, postcolonial, feminist and Latourian views, among others, have attempted to produce what I would ultimately be tempted to call a ‘sociological’ analysis of urban political-ecological transformations. What they share, despite their different — and often radically opposed — ontological and epistemological claims, is the view that critical social theory will offer an entry into strategies, mechanisms, technologies of resistance, transformation and emancipatory political tactics. In other words, the implicit assumption of this sociological edifice is that ‘the political’ is instituted by the social, that political configurations, arrangements and tactics arise out of the social condition or process or, in other words, that the social colonizes ‘the political’ (Arendt, 1968). The properly political moment is assumed to flow from this ‘sociological’ understanding or analysis of the process. Or in other words, the ‘political’ emerges, both theoretically and practically, from the social process, a process that only knowledge has access to. Put differently, most urban political ecological perspectives assume the political to arise from analysis, but neither theorizes nor operationalizes the properly political within a political ecological analysis. This opens a theoretical and practical gap as the properly political is evacuated from the theoretical considerations that have shaped (urban) political ecology thus far. This ‘retreat of the political’ (Lefort, 1988; Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997) requires urgent attention. This retreat of the properly political as a theoretical and practical object stands in strange contrast to the insistence of urban political ecology that urban socio-environmental conditions and processes are profoundly political ones and that, consequently, the production of different socio-environmental urban trajectories is a decidedly political process. Considering the properly political is indeed all the more urgent as environmental politics increasingly express a postpolitical consensual naturalization of the political. As argued by Swyngedouw (2007a), Žižek (2002 [1992]) and Debruyne (2007), among others, the present consensual vision that the environmental condition presents a clear and present danger that requires urgent techno-managerial re-alignments and a change in the practices of governance and of regulation, also annuls the properly political moment and contributes to what these and other authors have defined as the emergence and consolidation of a postpolitical condition. These will be the key themes I shall develop in this contribution. First, I shall explore what might be meant by the ‘properly’ political. In conversation with, and taking my cue from, political philosophers and theorists like Slavoj Žižek, Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Claude Lefort, David Crouch, Mustafa Dikeç, Chantalle Mouffe and Peter Hallward, I attempt to theorize and re-centre the political as a key moment in political-ecological processes. What these perspectives share is not only the refusal to accept the social as the foundation of the political, but, more profoundly, the view that the absence of a foundation for the social (or, in other words, the ‘social’ being constitutively split, inherently incoherent, ruptured by all manner of tensions and conflicts) calls into being ‘the political’ as the instituting moment of the social (see, e.g., Marchart, 2007; Stavrakakis, 2007). Put differently, it is through the political that ‘society’ comes into being, achieves a certain coherence and ‘sustainability’. Prioritizing ‘the political’ as the foundational gesture that permits ‘the social’ maintains ‘absolutely the separation of science and politics, of analytic description and political prescription’ (Badiou, quoted in Hallward, 2003a: 394). This is not to say, of course, that politics and science are not enmeshed (on the contrary, they are and increasingly so), but rather that unravelling the science/politics imbroglios (as pursued by, among others, critical sociologies of science, science and technology studies, science-discourse analysis and the like) does not in itself permit opening up either the notion or the terrain of the political. The aim of this article, in contrast, is to recover the notion of the political and of the political polis from the debris of contemporary obsessions with governing, management, urban polic(y)ing and its associated technologies (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997). Second, I shall argue that the particular staging of the environmental problem and its modes of management signals and helps to consolidate a postpolitical condition, one that evacuates the properly political from the plane of immanence that underpins any political intervention. The consolidation of an urban postpolitical arrangement runs, so I argue, parallel to the rise of a neoliberal governmentality that has replaced debate, disagreement and dissensus with a series of technologies of governing that fuse around consensus, agreement, accountancy metrics and technocratic environmental management. In the third part, I maintain that this postpolitical consensual police order revolves decidedly around embracing a populist gesture, one that annuls democracy and must, of necessity, lead to an ultra-politics of violent disavowal, radical closure and, ultimately, to the tyrannies of violence and of foreclosure of any real spaces of engagement. However, the disappearance of the political in a postpolitical arrangement leaves all manner of traces that allow for the resurfacing of the properly political. Indeed, the incoherencies of the contemporary urban ordering, the excesses and the gaps that are left in the interstices of the postpolitical urban order permit thinking through if not materially widening and occupying genuine political urban spaces. This will be the theme of the final section. I shall conclude that re-centring the political is a necessary condition for tackling questions of urban environmental justice and for creating different, but egalibertarian, socio-ecological urban assemblages. In Disagreement, Jacques Rancière revisits the Aristotelian foundations of political theory and considers whether the political can still be thought of in an environment in which a postpolitical consensual policy arrangement has increasingly reduced the ‘political’ to ‘policing’, to ‘policymaking’, to managerial consensual governing. This reduction of the political to the ‘mode of governing’ is particularly prevalent in environmental practices. From the environmental justice movement that urges the elites to rectify environmental ‘wrongs’ on the basis of a Rawlsian equal distribution of goods and bads (see also Beck, 1992), to ecological modernization perspectives that insist on the possibility of a technological-managerial conduct that can marry ecological sustainability with economic ‘progress’ (Harvey, 1996) and the scientific consensus that urges the adoption of a particular set of management and accounting rules to mitigate imminent catastrophic environmental disaster, general agreement exists, shared by a broad range of often unlikely allies, about the need to develop a more sustainable, and just, socio-ecological practice, one that operates fully within the contours of the existing social order (Swyngedouw, 2007a). Rancière's political philosophical mission, in contrast, is to re-centre the ‘political’ as distinct from ‘policy’ (what he calls ‘the police’) and to ask whether the properly political can be thought of and, if so, what constitutes a proper political gesture. Rancière distinguishes between ‘the police’ (le police), ‘the political’ (le politique) and ‘politics’ (la politique). For him, the political ‘turns on equality as its principle’ and is about enunciating dissent and rupture, literally voicing speech that claims a place in the order of things, demanding ‘the part for those who have no-part’ (Rancière, 2001: 6); politics disrupts the police order, ‘a refusal to observe the “place” allocated to people and things (or at least, to particular people and things)’ (Robson, 2005: 5). Indeed, as Dikeç maintains, the central premise of Rancière's politics is ‘the contingency of any established order of governance with its distributions of functions, people, and places’ (Dikeç, 2007: Chapter 2: 3). Politics, then, is the arena where the principle of equality is tested in the face of a wrong experienced by ‘those who have no part’. Equality is thereby axiomatically given and presupposed rather than an idealized-normative condition to move towards (Badiou, 1992; 2005a; Lévy et al., 2007): ‘Everyone can occupy the space of politics, if they decide to so' (Badiou, cited in Hallward, 2003a: 225). In democracy, the place of power is indeed structurally empty (Lefort, 1994) and equality is presupposed. In other words, equality is the very premise upon which a democratic politics is constituted; it opens up the space of the political through the testing of a wrong that subverts equality. Equality is, therefore, not a sociologically verifiable concept or procedure that permits opening a policy arena which will remedy the observed inequalities, but the ontologically given condition of democracy. Justice, from this perspective, disappears from the terrain of the moral and enters the space of the political under the name of equality. For Etienne Balibar (Balibar, 1993), for example, the unconditional premise for justice and emancipation resides in the fusion of equality and liberty (what he names as ‘égaliberté’), the former defined as the absence of discrimination and the latter as absence of repression (Dikeç, 2001). Egaliberté stands, thus, for the universal and collective process of emancipation on which the very promise of political democracy is founded. What is central to Balibar's and Rancière's vision is that neither freedom nor equality are offered, granted or distributed, they can only be conquered. The political, therefore, is not about expressing demands to the elites to rectify injustices, inequalities or unfreedoms, but about the enunciation of the right to égaliberté; the political is thus premised on the unconditionality of equality in a police arrangement that has always already ‘wronged’ the very condition of equality and liberty. Put simply, politics (or a properly political sequence) arises when, in the name of equality, those who are not equally included in the existing socio-political order, demand their ‘right to equality’, a demand that both calls the political into being, renders visible and exposes the ‘wrongs’ of the police order: this is the place and time of politics when the staging and articulation of an egalitarian demand exposes the lack, the superfluous, inscribed in the order of the given situation (Arsenjuk, 2005). This existing order of things or the police order is, in Rancière's words, ‘a partition of the sensible’ (Rancière, 2001: 8). The police refers to ‘all the activities which create order by distributing places, names, functions’ (Rancière, 1994: 173). It suggests ‘an established order of governance with everyone in their “proper” place in the seemingly natural order of things’ (Dikeç, 2005: 174). The partition of the sensible, the police order, ‘renders visible who can be part of the common in function of what he does, of the times and the space in which this activity is exercised . . . This defines the fact of being visible or not in a common space . . . It is a partitioning of times and spaces, of the visible and the invisible, of voice and noise that defines both the place (location) and the arena of the political as a form of experience’ (Rancière, 2000a: 13–14). The police is ‘not a social function but a symbolic constitution of the social’ (Rancière, 2001: 8) and refers to both the activities of the state as well as to the ordering of social relations: The police is thus first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise (Rancière, 1998: 29). It is important to recognize that ‘the police’ includes a multitude of activities and processes, is full of conflict and tension, never totally closed and embraces not only the traditional notion of the state and state functions and activities, but also the ‘assumed spontaneity of social relations’ (Dikeç, 2007: 18). In sum: The police, therefore, is both a principle of distribution and an apparatus of administration, which relies on a symbolically constituted organization of social space, an organization that becomes the basis of and for governance. Thus, the essence of policing is not repression but distribution — distribution of places, peoples, names, functions, authorities, activities and so on — and the normalization of this distribution (ibid.: 19). It is a rule governing the appearance of bodies, ‘a configuration of occupations and the properties of the spaces where these occupations are distributed’ (Rancière, 1998: 29). As such, the ‘police’ is rather close to Foucault's notion of governmentality, the conduct of conduct, the mode of assigning location, relations and distributions, or what Alain Badiou refers to as ‘the state of the situation’ (Badiou, 2005a). The police order is predicated upon saturation, upon suturing social space: ‘The essence of the police is the principle of saturation; it is a mode of the partition of the sensible that recognizes neither lack nor supplement. As conceived by “the police”, society is a totality compromised of groups performing specific functions and occupying determined spaces’ (Rancière, 2000b: 124). Of course, saturation is never realized; a sutured society is impossible as there will always be a constituted lack or surplus (Dikeç, 2005). It is exactly this lack or excess that constitutes the possibility of and that calls the political into being. If the supervision of places and functions is defined as the ‘police’, ‘a proper political sequence begins, then, when this supervision is interrupted so as to allow a properly anarchic disruption of function and place, a sweeping de-classification of speech. The democratic voice is the voice of those who reject the prevailing social distribution of roles, who refuse the way a society shares out power and authority’ (Hallward, 2003b: 192). The proper political act, Rancière maintains, is the voice of ‘floating subjects that deregulate all representations of places and portions’ (Rancière, 1998: 99–100): In the end everything in politics turns on the distribution of spaces. What are these places? How do they function? Why are they there? Who can occupy them? For me, political action always acts upon the social as the litigious distribution of places and roles. It is always a matter of knowing who is qualified to say what a particular place is and what is done to it (Rancière, 2003a: 201). Politics proper arises then when the police order is dislocated, transgressed, ‘when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have no part’ (Rancière, 1998: 11). ‘Politics in general . . . is about the visibilities of places and abilities of the body in these places, about the partition of public and private spaces, about the very configuration of the visible and the relation of the visible to what can be said about it. All this is what I call the partition of the sensible’ (Rancière, 2003b: 3). The political arises when the given order of things is questioned; when those whose voice is only recognized as noise by the police order claim the right to speak, acquire speech. As such, it disrupts the order of being, exposes the constituent antagonisms and voids that constitute the police order and tests the principle of equality. The proper democratic political sequence, therefore, is not one that seeks justice and equality through governmental procedures on the basis of sociologically defined injustice, but rather starts from the paradigmatic condition of equality or égaliberté, one that is ‘wronged’ by the police order. Such procedure brings into being a new symbolic ordering, one that transgresses the limitations of police symbolization. Therefore, a proper environmental politics is one that asserts the principle of equality and justice as its original principle, not as a normative goal; it demands equality in the right to produce proper and properly democratic socio-physical environments. Democratic politics is, therefore, always disruptive and transformative: Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place's destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as discourse what was once only heard as noise (Rancière, 1998: 30). Politics acts on the police (ibid.: 33) . . . revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time (Rancière, 2006: 13). The space of the political is to ‘disturb this arrangement [the police] by supplementing it with a part of the no-part identified with the community as a whole’ (Rancière, 2001). And, of course, politics is about the production of spaces, the making of environments and the recognition of the principle of dissensus as the proper base for politics. As Rancière attests: The principle function of politics is the configuration of its proper space. It is to disclose the world of its subjects and its operations. The essence of politics is the manifestation of dissensus, as the presence of two worlds in one’ (ibid.: Thesis 8). It occurs when there is a place and a way for the meeting of the police process with the process of equality (Rancière, 1998: 30). Politics has, therefore, no specific place: ‘Politics “takes place” in the space of the police, by rephrasing and restaging social issues, police problems and so on’ (Rancière, 2003c: 7); it is the disruption of the police order. It can arise anywhere and everywhere. [S]pace becomes political in that it . . . becomes an integral element of the interruption of the ‘natural’ (or, better yet, naturalized) order of domination through the constitution of a place of encounter by those that have no part in that order. The political, in this account, is signaled by this encounter as a moment of interruption, and not by the mere presence of power relations and competing interests (Dikeç, 2005: 172).

### Bargain CP 1NC

#### Text:

#### The United States President should enter into prior and binding consultation with the United States Congress over the substantial reduction of leasing restrictions on natural gas drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf. The President should offer to support the substantial reduction of leasing restrictions on natural gas drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf, if Congress agrees to invest 90 percent of federal revenues from the resulting production into clean energy research and development.

#### UMW Plan: The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce leasing restrictions on natural gas drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf.

#### Observation One: Theory. The Counterplan is legitimate. It is grounded in the topic literature making it predictable and educational. Net benefits prove it is a germane policy making consideration.

#### Observation Two: Net Benefits

#### First, the counterplan solves the case and avoids politics-Leveraging the removal of restrictions effectively builds bipartisan support for investing in clean energy research and development.

[Jenkins](http://thebreakthrough.org/people/profile/Jesse-Jenkins) [and Borofsky](http://thebreakthrough.org/people/profile/Yael-Borofsky)-Breakthrough Institute-4/10

After "Drill, Baby, Drill," Obama Should Embrace Another GOP Energy Plan

http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/after\_drill\_baby\_drill\_obama\_s

So while the expansion of offshore drilling may seem like we're taking a step back from a future free from oil, investing the royalty revenues in clean tech RD&D could amount to a big leap forward in the transition to a clean energy economy by securing a revenue source for clean tech that is not tied to embattled efforts to establish a carbon price -- all while beginning the urgent work of securing America's clean tech competitiveness and ensuring our energy security. Nearly the entire Republican caucus, not to mention a handful of Democrats, are already on record voting for this concept in the August 2008 vote on the New Energy Reform Act, introduced by the so-called Gang of 10 during the height of the oil price spikes in 2008. If offshore drilling is to move forward over the next few years, the Obama Administration and Congressional Democrats should waste no time in embracing this clean energy investment plan.

#### Second, turns the case---the counterplan is key to energy diversification and security

[Jenkins](http://thebreakthrough.org/people/profile/Jesse-Jenkins) [and Borofsky](http://thebreakthrough.org/people/profile/Yael-Borofsky)-Breakthrough Institute-4/10

After "Drill, Baby, Drill," Obama Should Embrace Another GOP Energy Plan

http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/after\_drill\_baby\_drill\_obama\_s

After all, we simply cannot drill our way to energy security. The New York Times reports that at current rates of consumption, estimates show that there could be as much as a three-year supply of oil and around a two-year supply of natural gas in the OCS areas. That's not exactly a long-term 'fix' for an oil-addicted nation, which is why Obama noted Wednesday in his speech at Andrews Air Force Base that offshore drilling is meant merely to aid in the "transition to cleaner energy sources;" drilling is no alternative. We can, however, invest and invent our way to freedom from oil. That's where (somewhat ironically!) the Republicans 'all of the above' energy plan, AKA the "American Energy Act," has a leg up on the President -- at least for now. Under the GOP proposal, put forth by House Republicans in June 2009, 90% of the federal share "of the revenues created by OCS exploration would go to a renewable energy trust fund to pay for a variety of renewable, alternative and advanced energy programs." This "American Renewable and Alternative Energy Trust Fund" would be dedicated to efforts accelerating the development of clean energy technologies that can truly help end America's oil addiction. If the federal government retained 75% of the royalty revenues from new OCS and Alaskan Coastal Plain production, this formula could represent an infusion of over $110 billion for critical clean energy investments over the next twenty years.

#### R+D and innovation are key

Stepp 12 (Matthew Stepp is a Senior Analyst with the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) specializing in climate change and clean energy policy. His research interests include clean energy technology development, climate science policy development, transportation policy, and the role innovation has in economic growth. “The Future of Global Climate Policy: Clean Energy Innovation Imperative (Part 3)”

The bulwark of an effective energy innovation system is the aggressive pursuit of new products, new services, performance improvements and cost declines across each stage of innovation and technology maturation. It includes major support for R&D for both radical new clean technologies like vehicle batteries that travel 500 miles or more on a single charge as well as includes steady incremental improvements in existing designs like on-shore wind turbines. The ecosystem supports the accelerated commercialization and demonstration of new clean technologies so potential breakthrough ideas don’t collect dust on a laboratory’s shelf. And the ecosystem includes deployment policies that should be explicitly designed to ensure that every dollar invested provides the best incentives for further innovation and cost declines. Deployment policies must play a key role in creating markets for clean energy, but we must ensure that those markets have the right structure and offer the right incentives to demand and reward continual improvements in the price and performance of clean technologies.

The ultimate goal of this system is to use limited public investments to support a variety of clean energy technologies on a path to subsidy independence and true cost competitiveness with fossil fuels, as quickly as possible. It ensures we not only smartly deploy clean technologies today, but make these technologies affordable enough for the rapid, widespread, global adoption needed to drastically cut emissions.

As it stands, America’s clean energy innovation ecosystem has significant weaknesses and is not running at top gear. The goal of climate advocates should be to strengthen the innovation ecosystem so it can develop cheaper options in a small fraction of the time it took solar PV to decrease in cost. If we take our climate outlook seriously, we have to focus just as seriously on efforts to strengthen and support the energy innovation ecosystem to make clean energy cheap. It’s our only realistic way to limit any further potentially dangerous climate change than what we are already locked ourselves into.

#### Renewable transition solves extinction from climate change and great power war

Klarevas 09

[Louis Klarevas, Professor for Center for Global Affairs at New York University, “Securing American Primacy While Tackling Climate Change: Toward a National Strategy of Greengemony,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/louis-klarevas/securing-american-primacy\_b\_393223.html]

As national leaders from around the world are gathering in Copenhagen, Denmark, to attend the United Nations Climate Change Conference, the time is ripe to re-assess America's current energy policies - but within the larger framework of how a new approach on the environment will stave off global warming and shore up American primacy. By not addressing climate change more aggressively and creatively, the United States is squandering an opportunity to secure its global primacy for the next few generations to come. To do this, though, the U.S. must rely on innovation to help the world escape the coming environmental meltdown. Developing the key technologies that will save the planet from global warming will allow the U.S. to outmaneuver potential great power rivals seeking to replace it as the international system's hegemon. But the greening of American strategy must occur soon. The U.S., however, seems to be stuck in time, unable to move beyond oil-centric geo-politics in any meaningful way. Often, the gridlock is portrayed as a partisan difference, with Republicans resisting action and Democrats pleading for action. This, though, is an unfair characterization as there are numerous proactive Republicans and quite a few reticent Democrats. The real divide is instead one between realists and liberals. Students of realpolitik, which still heavily guides American foreign policy, largely discount environmental issues as they are not seen as advancing national interests in a way that generates relative power advantages vis-à-vis the other major powers in the system: Russia, China, Japan, India, and the European Union. Liberals, on the other hand, have recognized that global warming might very well become the greatest challenge ever faced by mankind. As such, their thinking often eschews narrowly defined national interests for the greater global good. This, though, ruffles elected officials whose sworn obligation is, above all, to protect and promote American national interests. What both sides need to understand is that by becoming a lean, mean, green fighting machine, the U.S. can actually bring together liberals and realists to advance a collective interest which benefits every nation, while at the same time, secur[e]ing America's global primacy well into the future. To do so, the U.S. must re-invent itself as not just your traditional hegemon, but as history's first ever green hegemon. Hegemons are countries that dominate the international system - bailing out other countries in times of global crisis, establishing and maintaining the most important international institutions, and covering the costs that result from free-riding and cheating global obligations. Since 1945, that role has been the purview of the United States. Immediately after World War II, Europe and Asia laid in ruin, the global economy required resuscitation, the countries of the free world needed security guarantees, and the entire system longed for a multilateral forum where global concerns could be addressed. The U.S., emerging the least scathed by the systemic crisis of fascism's rise, stepped up to the challenge and established the postwar (and current) liberal order. But don't let the world "liberal" fool you. While many nations benefited from America's new-found hegemony, the U.S. was driven largely by "realist" selfish national interests. The liberal order first and foremost benefited the U.S. With the U.S. becoming bogged down in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, running a record national debt, and failing to shore up the dollar, the future of American hegemony now seems to be facing a serious contest: potential rivals - acting like sharks smelling blood in the water - wish to challenge the U.S. on a variety of fronts. This has led numerous commentators to forecast the U.S.'s imminent fall from grace. Not all hope is lost however. With the impending systemic crisis of global warming on the horizon, the U.S. again finds itself in a position to address a transnational problem in a way that will benefit both the international community collectively and the U.S. selfishly. The current problem is two-fold. First, the competition for oil is fueling animosities between the major powers. The geopolitics of oil has already emboldened Russia in its 'near abroad' and China in far-off places like Africa and Latin America. As oil is a limited natural resource, a nasty zero-sum contest could be looming on the horizon for the U.S. and its major power rivals - a contest which threatens American primacy and global stability. Second, converting fossil fuels like oil to run national economies is producing irreversible harm in the form of carbon dioxide emissions. So long as the global economy remains oil-dependent, greenhouse gases will continue to rise. Experts are predicting as much as a 60% increase in carbon dioxide emissions in the next twenty-five years. That likely means more devastating water shortages, droughts, forest fires, floods, and storms. In other words, if global competition for access to energy resources does not undermine international security, global warming will. And in either case, oil will be a culprit for the instability. Oil arguably has been the most precious energy resource of the last half-century. But "black gold" is so 20th century. The key resource for this century will be green gold - clean, environmentally-friendly energy like wind, solar, and hydrogen power. Climate change leaves no alternative. And the sooner we realize this, the better off we will be. What Washington must do in order to avoid the traps of petropolitics is to convert the U.S. into the world's first-ever green hegemon. For starters, the federal government must drastically increase investment in energy and environmental research and development (E&E R&D). This will require a serious sacrifice, committing upwards of $40 billion annually to E&E R&D - a far cry from the few billion dollars currently being spent. By promoting a new national project, the U.S. could develop new technologies that will assure it does not drown in a pool of oil. Some solutions are already well known, such as raising fuel standards for automobiles; improving public transportation networks; and expanding nuclear and wind power sources. Others, however, have not progressed much beyond the drawing board: batteries that can store massive amounts of solar (and possibly even wind) power; efficient and cost-effective photovoltaic cells, crop-fuels, and hydrogen-based fuels; and even fusion. Such innovations will not only provide alternatives to oil, they will also give the U.S. an edge in the global competition for hegemony. If the U.S. is able to produce technologies that allow modern, globalized societies to escape the oil trap, those nations will eventually have no choice but to adopt such technologies. And this will give the U.S. a tremendous economic boom, while simultaneously providing it with means of leverage that can be employed to keep potential foes in check. The bottom-line is that the U.S. needs to become green energy dominant as opposed to black energy independent - and the best approach for achieving this is to promote a national strategy of greengemony.

### 1NC Warming

#### they can keep up current production and prices, their evidence is industry drama, well productivity and less bottlenecks prove

Zeits, citing the EIA, 9/3 (Richard Zeits is an Energy industry consultant and investment analyst. His background includes fourteen years as investment banker, portfolio manager and senior investment analyst with bulge bracket firms in New York. Zeits Energy Analytics provide custom industry research, market intelligence, investment analyses and transaction advisory services to investment professionals and industry practitioners. “Latest EIA Data Shows Resilient U.S. Natural Gas Production” http://seekingalpha.com/article/842541-latest-eia-data-shows-resilient-u-s-natural-gas-production)

On Friday, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) released natural gas production statistics for the month of June and revised statistics for May. The report will again disappoint those analysts and industry insiders who have predicted an imminent drop off in US natural gas supply in response to the dramatic decline in gas prices during the first half of the year. In defiance of the sub-$2 NYMEX natural gas lows registered in April and continued steep decline in gas-directed rig count, the Lower 48 States' natural gas production remained essentially unchanged in May and June. The Lower 48 production declined in June from May by an almost negligible 0.18 Bcf/d or 0.2%. The production shut-ins in the Gulf of Mexico due to Tropical Storm Debby largely accounted for the decline. The revised May data shows a slight increase in production from April. The Lower 48 natural gas production remained essentially flat from November last year through June (the latest data available). I argued in my earlier note that the natural gas industry is producing at levels exceeding demand, which is manifest in the strong build-up of storage levels and very high backlog of drilled wells waiting on completion or pipeline connection. The flat production figures indicate that the supply/demand balance was still not achieved in June, despite the highly unattractive economics of the dry gas drilling. The report highlights the continued trend of the Marcellus shale production gradually displacing volumes from less economic regions. The Other States gross withdrawals (the key growth behind which is the Marcellus shale) increased by a remarkable 1.9 Bcf/d during the seven-month period from November last year to June this year. The June numbers indicate that the growth trend continued unabated (Other States gross withdrawals increased by 120 MMcf/d in June and 400 MMcf/d in May).What may come as a surprise is the distinct decline trend in the Wyoming production (which includes the prolific Pinedale and Jonah fields). The Pinedale has been broadly perceived in the industry and among investors as one of the lowest cost fields in the United States. Recent decisions by Ultra Petroleum Corp. (UPL), one of the larger operators in the Pinedale, to significantly reduce its completions activity in the Pinedale may cast doubt on the cost of supply economics from the field relative to other regions. A month ago, I argued in several of my notes that the strong drop off in the natural gas rig count does not readily translate in the decline in the natural gas production. Several factors are contributing: A significant backlog of curtailed or shut in production from earlier in the year that will need to find its way to the market once the injection season is over. Two companies alone, Chesapeake Energy Corporation (CHK) and Encana Corporation (ECA), had estimated combined gross operated production of 1.3-1.4 Bcf/d shut in or curtailed during the first half of the year. Chesapeake has guided that it intends to reverse its production curtailments during the next two quarters, which should lead to its natural gas production peaking before the end of the year at a level that is 12% higher than the company's average production during Q2. A significant inventory of wells waiting on completions or pipeline connections. Some of the backlog is explained by the infrastructure constraints in the growing producing areas such as the Marcellus and the Eagle Ford. As the bottlenecks are being resolved, the backlog wells will gradually come online. Most notably, the excess well inventory also reflects deliberate decisions by operators to defer well completions and tie-ins until the expected price recovery in the second half of the year, effectively creating "rig-independent" supply. Improving well performance and rig productivity. As operators focus on drilling only the very best dry gas wells due to the depressed price environment, production per rig is increasing. Productivity gains from the high-graded rig fleet and pad drilling are another important contributing factor. Rapid growth of liquids-rich and associated gas volumes. The rate of growth from this important source of natural gas supply appears to be underestimated by many Wall Street analysts and industry insiders, same way the volume growth from the Haynesville shale and the Marcellus shale was grossly underestimated just two or three years ago. Looking forward, all these factors will contribute to a delayed and shallower decline in the US natural gas production than may appear. As a result, natural gas prices will likely remain vulnerable to corrections until the massive production backlog from various sources is absorbed. These fundamentals have implications for natural gas producer stocks that as a group appear to price in a meaningful recovery in natural gas prices. While in the longer run a return to more economic natural gas price levels is inevitable, the recovery may not be as imminent as often predicted. This fundamental dynamic is most relevant to stocks with natural gas focus and high financial leverage.

#### They have to replace virtually every coal plant in the globe- and this card is from 2009

Kirsch ‘9 (Steve Kirsch, Entrepreneur and philanthropist, “Climate Bill Ignores Our Biggest Clean Energy Source”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-kirsch/climate-bill-ignores-our_b_221796.html>, June 27, 2009)

Do you think our country's energy policy is in good hands now that the American Clean Energy and Security (ACES) climate bill has passed the House? I'm very worried and I think you should be too. Experts fret about balancing energy, environment, and the economy. But there is a way to have all three at the same time if we are willing to take a fresh look at an old technology. And that great solution is nowhere to be found in the ACES bill. First, let's start by assuming science of global warming is correct. We'll see later that we'd want to do exactly the same thing even if we didn't believe in global warming at all. To stop global warming, we must virtually eliminate the use of coal worldwide Dr. James Hansen, one of our nation's leading experts on global warming, is very clear about the necessary attributes of any solution: we must stop building new coal plants immediately and start retiring existing coal plants worldwide. If we cannot virtually eliminate coal worldwide within a couple of decades, then the sum total of all of our other efforts to reduce our carbon footprint will be about as effective as rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.

No extinction

Barrett, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, ‘7

(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

#### No impact – recent data proves CO2 escapes

Taylor 11 (James, is a senior fellow for environment policy at the Heartland Institute and managing editor of Environment & Climate News. “New NASA Data Blow Gaping Hole In Global Warming Alarmism” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamestaylor/2011/07/27/new-nasa-data-blow-gaping-hold-in-global-warming-alarmism/>)

NASA satellite data from the years 2000 through 2011 show the Earth’s atmosphere is allowing far more heat to be released into space than alarmist computer models have predicted, reports a new study in the peer-reviewed science journal Remote Sensing. The study indicates far less future global warming will occur than United Nations computer models have predicted, and supports prior studies indicating increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide trap far less heat than alarmists have claimed. Study co-author Dr. Roy Spencer, a principal research scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville and U.S. Science Team Leader for the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer flying on NASA’s Aqua satellite, reports that real-world data from NASA’s Terra satellite contradict multiple assumptions fed into alarmist computer models. “The satellite observations suggest there is much more energy lost to space during and after warming than the climate models show,” Spencer said in a July 26 University of Alabama press release. “There is a huge discrepancy between the data and the forecasts that is especially big over the oceans.” In addition to finding that far less heat is being trapped than alarmist computer models have predicted, the NASA satellite data show the atmosphere begins shedding heat into space long before United Nations computer models predicted. The new findings are extremely important and should dramatically alter the global warming debate. Scientists on all sides of the global warming debate are in general agreement about how much heat is being directly trapped by human emissions of carbon dioxide (the answer is “not much”). However, the single most important issue in the global warming debate is whether carbon dioxide emissions will indirectly trap far more heat by causing large increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds. Alarmist computer models assume human carbon dioxide emissions indirectly cause substantial increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds (each of which are very effective at trapping heat), but real-world data have long shown that carbon dioxide emissions are not causing as much atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds as the alarmist computer models have predicted. The new NASA Terra satellite data are consistent with long-term NOAA and NASA data indicating atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds are not increasing in the manner predicted by alarmist computer models. The Terra satellite data also support data collected by NASA’s ERBS satellite showing far more longwave radiation (and thus, heat) escaped into space between 1985 and 1999 than alarmist computer models had predicted. Together, the NASA ERBS and Terra satellite data show that for 25 years and counting, carbon dioxide emissions have directly and indirectly trapped far less heat than alarmist computer models have predicted. In short, the central premise of alarmist global warming theory is that carbon dioxide emissions should be directly and indirectly trapping a certain amount of heat in the earth’s atmosphere and preventing it from escaping into space. Real-world measurements, however, show far less heat is being trapped in the earth’s atmosphere than the alarmist computer models predict, and far more heat is escaping into space than the alarmist computer models predict.

Exporting LNG increases emissions and causes catastrophic warming and extinction

Romm 12 (Joe Romm – PhD from MIT, Fellow at American Progress, editor of Climate Progress, previously assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy. “Exporting Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Is Bad For The Climate,” Jun 18, 2012 <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/06/18/500954/exporting-liquefied-natural-gas-lng-is-bad-for-the-climate/>)

The surge in U.S. production of shale gas is creating a surge in permit requests to build liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals. That’s because the glut of U.S. gas has dropped domestic prices sharply below global price levels. But if avoiding catastrophic climate change is your goal, then spending huge sums on even conventional natural gas infrastructure is not the answer, as a recent International Energy Agency report made clear: The speciﬁc emissions from a gas-ﬁred power plant will be higher than average global CO2 intensity in electricity generation by 2025, raising questions around the long-term viability of some gas infrastructure investment if climate change objectives are to be met. And liquefying natural gas is an energy intensive and leaky process. When you factor in shipping overseas, you get an energy penalty of 20% or more. The extra greenhouse gas emissions can equal 30% or more of combustion emissions, according to a 2009 Reference Report by the Joint Research Centreof the European Commission, Liquefied Natural Gas for Europe – Some Important Issues for Consideration. Such extra emissions all but eliminate whatever small, short-term benefit there might be of building billion-dollar export terminals and other LNG infrastructure, which in any case will last many decades, long after the electric grid will not benefit from replacing coal with gas. Furthermore, the U.S. Energy Information Administration concluded in a 2012 report on natural gas exports done for DOE’s Office of Fossil Energy that such exports would also increase domestic greenhouse gas emissions: [W]hen also accounting for emissions related to natural gas used in the liquefaction process, additional exports increase CO2 levels under all cases and export scenarios, particularly in the earlier years of the projection period. Asserting any net benefit for the importer requires assuming the new gas replaces only coal — and isn’t used for, say, natural gas vehicles, which are worse for the climate or that it doesn’t replace new renewables. If even a modest fraction of the imported LNG displaces renewables, it renders the entire expenditure for LNG counterproductive from day one. Remember, a major new 2012 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences study on “technology warming potentials” (TWPs) found that a big switch from coal to gas would only reduce TWP by about 25% over the first three decades (see “Natural Gas Is A Bridge To Nowhere Absent A Carbon Price AND Strong Standards To Reduce Methane Leakage“). And that is based on “EPA’s latest estimate of the amount of CH4 released because of leaks and venting in the natural gas network between production wells and the local distribution network” of 2.4%. Many experts believe the leakage rate is higher than 2.4%, particularly for shale gas. Also, recent air sampling by NOAA over Colorado found 4% methane leakage, more than double industry claims. A different 2012 study by climatologist Ken Caldeira and tech guru Nathan Myhrvold finds basically no benefit in the switch whatsoever — see You Can’t Slow Projected Warming With Gas, You Need ‘Rapid and Massive Deployment’ of Zero-Carbon Power. So spending vast sums of money to export natural gas from this country is a bad idea for the climate. A new paper published last week by Brooking’s Hamilton Project, “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports,” asserts a different conclusion, primarily because it ignores all of the issues discussed above. Indeed, the paper rather amazingly asserts “Natural gas, though, has the same climate consequences whether it is burned in the United States, Europe, or Asia,” which would be true for exported U.S. gas only if we could use magic to take the U.S. shale gas and put it into European or Asian gas-fired power plants. In the real world, it takes a massive amount of energy and greenhouse gas emissions to get gas from here to those markets, as is well known in the climate policy arena. BOTTOM LINE: Investing billions of dollars in new shale gas infrastructure for domestic use is, at best, of limited value for a short period of time if we put in place both a CO2 price and regulations to minimize methane leakage. Exporting gas vitiates even that limited value and so investing billions in LNG infrastructure is, at best, a waste of resources better utilized for deploying truly low-carbon energy. At worst, it helps accelerates the world past the 2°C warming threshold into Terra incognita — a planet of amplifying feedbacks and multiple simultaneous catastrophic impacts.

**Takes a decade to scale up exports**

**Romm, 12** – Climate Progress editor, Ph.D. in physics from MIT

(Joe, American Progress fellow, former acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy, "Exporting Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Is Still Bad For The Climate — And A Very Poor Long-Term Investment," Think Progress, 8-16-12, thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/08/16/699601/exporting-liquefied-natural-gas-lng-bad-for-climate-poor-long-term-investment/?mobile=nc, accessed 8-16-12, mss)

The NY Times piece actually makes this odd argument on behalf of LNG exports: “It will take **years** before any export terminals are up and running — in the meantime, producers and regulators should strengthen safeguards so that gas is extracted safely.” But this is yet another reason why LNG exports make no sense. Why would we want to start massive exports of natural gas around the **end of this decade**, with costly new infrastructure that until mid-century?

#### The aff can’t solve exports because of trade barriers

Dlouhy 7/16/12 (Jennifer A., staffwriter, “Natural gas glut a dilemma for Obama” http://www.chron.com/business/article/Natural-gas-glut-a-dilemma-for-Obama-3706576.php)

WASHINGTON - The drilling boom that has led to a glut of natural gas and sent prices to 10-year lows is causing a quandary for the Obama administration, which is struggling to decide whether - and how much - the U.S. should share the bounty with foreign countries. Although the Energy Department recently approved Houston-based Cheniere Energy's plans to begin exporting liquefied natural gas from its Sabine Pass terminal in southwest Louisiana, the government has put off verdicts on similar applications from at least seven other companies. Administration officials say they'll make those decisions after they get the results of a study commissioned by the Energy Department on how allowing companies to sell U.S.-produced natural gas overseas would affect prices for American consumers. The study is due out this summer. "We want analysis to drive decisions," White House energy adviser Heather Zichal said at a recent forum. The administration supports domestic natural gas and isn't opposed to exports, she said, but also is committed to "protecting American consumers and making sure we're sending the right signal to industry and the manufacturing sector." The dilemma is politically treacherous in an election year and struggling economy. Although the United States already exports some natural gas - mostly by pipelines to Mexico and Canada - the flurry of proposals to liquefy natural gas for tanker shipment and sell it to foreign consumers would mean a big jump in exports. Applications filed with the Energy Department could put the United States on track to export about 16 billion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas each day - nearly a quarter of U.S. daily production in 2011. But few expect all of those proposals to win federal approval, and it could be years before construction is finished on even those projects that win the green light. Experts at IHS CERA say the realistic potential market for exports from the U.S. and Canada is 4 billion to 5 billion cubic feet per day by 2020. An Energy Information Administration report released in January concluded that exporting natural gas would cause prices to climb in the U.S. According to the agency, consumers' electricity bills would increase by 1 percent to 3 percent from 2015 to 2035 and industrial prices would climb 9 percent to 28 percent. Unlike crude, which is a globally traded commodity, natural gas is traded on non-integrated markets, resulting in huge price variations in different places. The prospect of selling natural gas in Asian and European markets at five times its price in the U.S. is enough to make most domestic producers giddy. Energy companies and analysts have argued that current U.S. natural gas prices are unsustainable. It closed Friday at $2.874 per million British thermal units in trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The opposing argument is that exports could cause prices to spike, sending electricity bills upward and jeopardizing a resurgence in domestic manufacturing tied to abundant, cheap natural gas. Manufacturers that use natural gas to fuel their plants and as a building block to make other products were hit hard over the past two decades by volatile swings in prices, which last peaked over $15 in 2005. Because any position risks alienating important constituencies - energy producers and manufacturers as well as voters - few elected officials are pushing the issue.

### 1NC Prices

#### Too hard to cut back on supplies and production will continue even without exports– the need to pay back loans, use-it or lose it leases, and company buy-outs require continued production

Tverberg 3/23/12 (Gail, an actuary interested in finite world issues - oil depletion, natural gas depletion, water shortages, and climate change. The financial system is also likely to be affected. “Why US natural gas prices are so low – Are changes needed?” <http://ourfiniteworld.com/2012/03/23/why-us-natural-gas-prices-are-so-low-are-changes-needed/>)

3. Supply doesn’t drop quickly. Natural gas supply (Figure 5, above) does not drop very quickly when prices drop too low because long lead times and large investment is needed to bring supply on-line. Natural gas producers have debt to service and are often faced with “use it or lose it” leases, so are hesitant to stop, for fear of not being able to make use of their investment. A decline in price may be hedged, so the producer does not feel the effect as quickly as otherwise, and take appropriate action. Profitability of individual wells is based on estimates of long-term future production and future costs–things which are not at all certain. Some small producers may not even be aware of how unprofitable current prices really are. There is also the issue of large oil and gas companies having difficulty “replacing their oil reserves,” and needing natural gas reserves to substitute for oil reserves. These large oil companies are willing to buy natural gas companies, even if the cost would seem to be far too high, given recent prices. These willing buyers allow production to keep expanding, creating a greater over-supply situation before a shake-out occurs.

#### Production will stay high

Reuters 8/25/12 (“UPDATE 3-U.S. natgas futures end lower, reverse early gains” <http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/24/markets-nymex-natgas-idINL2E8JO3ID20120824>)

NEW YORK, Aug 24 (Reuters) - U.S. natural gas futures ended lower on Friday, reversing early gains as traders shrugged off concerns about possible storm-related supply disruptions and focused instead on swelling inventories and forecasts for moderating weather. Traders said short covering propped up gas futures prices early amid worries that Tropical Storm Isaac could steer into the Gulf of Mexico and force producers to shut in some supply. But with inventory builds likely to pick up as temperatures finally begin to moderate from some record heat this summer, few traders expect much upside in prices in the near term. "Cooling loads have backed off this morning in the models for the next 10 days. That leaves CDDs (cooling degree days) only a hair above normal on net," Gelber & Associates analyst Patrick Saunders said in a report. "The breakdown of price ... shows some confidence from market shorts that prices could tumble into expiry." September gas futures on the New York Mercantile Exchange, which expire on Wednesday, ended down 10 cents, or 3.6 percent, at $2.702 per million British thermal units after stalling overnight at a two-week high of $2.877, then sinking to $2.698 late in the session. The nearby contract peaked this year in late July at $3.28 after record heat kicked up demand, then hit a two-month low of $2.682 on Thursday after a bearish weekly inventory report. While several companies including BP and Shell have begun evacuating nonessential workers from some offshore platforms, some traders dismissed concerns about possible supply cuts. They noted that Gulf of Mexico production makes up just 6 percent of total U.S. supply, down sharply from nine years ago when it provided more than 20 percent of the nation's output. The boom in shale gas production in the last five or six years has shifted most new drilling inland, providing a buffer against the fierce storms that can hit coastal facilities. The U.S. National Hurricane Center said Isaac, currently located in the central Caribbean, could be near hurricane strength before reaching Hispaniola tonight. The NHC track shows the system possibly steering into the eastern Gulf of Mexico, which could disrupt some offshore gas production and lend some support to prices early next week. NHC was also monitoring a low pressure system in the eastern Atlantic, another reminder that the peak of the hurricane season in September was still ahead. While temperatures have moderated somewhat from the record heat in July, traders said there was still some warmth ahead for the Midwest and Northeast that should stir a little demand. Many traders remain skeptical of any upside, noting that peak summer heat is likely to fade in the next couple of weeks and storage and production are still at or near record highs. RIG DECLINES FAIL TO SLOW PRODUCTION Data from Baker Hughes on Friday showed the gas-directed rig count rose by two this week to 486 after slipping last week to a 13-year low. It was the first gain in the gas rig count in seven weeks and only the sixth increase this year. The nearly steady 48-percent drop in gas-directed drilling over the last 10 months has fed expectations that producers were getting serious about stemming the flood of record supplies. But so far there is little evidence that gas output is slowing. (Rig graphic: r.reuters.com/dyb62s ) Baker Hughes also reported that horizontal rigs, the type used to extract oil or gas from shale, increased for the third time in four weeks, adding six to 1,159. The horizontal count is down just 2.8 percent from the record high of 1,193 set in May. Dry gas drilling may be largely uneconomical at current prices, but the associated gas produced from more profitable shale oil and shale gas liquids wells is likely to keep gas production at a record high for a second straight year. STORAGE BUILD ABOVE EXPECTATIONS Most traders viewed Thursday's 47 billion cubic feet weekly inventory build as bearish, noting it came in well above the Reuters poll estimate of 38 bcf. The U.S. Energy Information Administration report showed that gas inventories climbed last week to 3.308 trillion cubic feet. (Storage graphic: link.reuters.com/mup44s) While a huge inventory surplus, which peaked in late March at nearly 900 bcf above a year earlier, has been cut in half as record heat this summer slowed weekly builds, storage remains at record highs for this time of year. At 81 percent full, stocks are at levels not normally reached until the third week of September and offer a huge cushion that can help offset any weather-related spikes in demand or Gulf Coast supply disruptions from storms. With summer heat winding down, concerns remain that the storage overhang could drive prices to new lows this autumn if inventories climb to levels that test the government's 4.1-tcf estimate of capacity. Early injection estimates for next week's EIA report range from 49 bcf to 62 bcf versus a year-earlier build of 60 bcf and the five-year average increase for the week of 62 bcf.

#### ---Economic decline does not cause war.

Miller 2000

Morris, Professor of Administration @ the University of Ottawa, Interdisciplinary Science Review, v 25 n4 2000 p ingenta connect

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### ---No Impact --- Iraq and Afghanistan prove that even if economic decline incentivizes war; power imbalances between nation states prevent escalation.

#### ---Economic decline creates a structural incentive for military caution --- Makes politicians sensitive to backlash.

Boehmer 2007

Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”

The theory presented earlier predicts that lower rates of growth suppress participation in foreign conflicts, particularly concerning conflict initiation and escalation to combat. To sustain combat, states need to be militarily prepared and not open up a second front when they are already fighting, or may fear, domestic opposition. A good example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters expelled the Soviet Union from their territory, but the Taliban crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States and Northern Alliance insurrection. Yet the coefficient for GDP growth and MID initiations was negative but insignificant. However, considering that there are many reasons why states fight, the logic presented earlier should hold especially in regard to the risk of participating in more severe conflicts. Threats to use military force may be safe to make and may be made with both external and internal actors in mind, but in the end may remain mere cheap talk that does not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) found that secure leaders were more likely to become involved in war than insecure leaders, supporting the theory and evidence presented here. We should find that leaders who face domestic opposition and a poorly performing economy shy away from situations that could escalate to combat if doing so would compromise their ability to retain power.

Eurozone collapse doesn’t spill-over globally – Recession will stay in

Hasenstab, Portfolio Manager and Co-Director of the International Bond Department for Franklin Templeton Fixed Income Group., 1-18-12

[Michael, Euro Zone Woes Cannot Sink Asia: Expert, http://www.cnbc.com/id/46049692]

The recent weakness in asset markets in Asia shows that investors now believe Europe’s woes will put the region at risk. But whether this fear is justified depends on two possible scenarios – a breakup of the euro zone or a European recession. Those who believe in the first scenario have reason to be worried. A euro zone breakup involving any of the major economies would have an impact worse than the one seen after the Lehman collapse. We would see a domino effect on sovereign debt defaults and foreign exchange markets would be plunged into chaos by the sudden disappearance of the world’s second most important reserve currency. But how likely is this scenario? Very unlikely. Recent moves towards establishing a stronger fiscal union in Europe, unprecedented and massive provisioning of liquidity through both the European Central Bank (ECB) and national central banks, the massive additional balance sheet capacity of the ECB, fiscal and structural reforms in Italy, and the prohibitive costs of an exit from the euro for any major member of the European Monetary Union, including Germany, should ensure that the first scenario does not materialize. However, the second scenario of a painful deleveraging in many European banks and anemically weak European growth is possible. This outcome would be bad for Europe, but not bad enough to undermine the outlook for stronger parts of the global economy, especially emerging Asia. Here’s why. Europe was not the main engine of the global economy to start off with, and it remains a relatively closed economy. A European recession, especially if deeper and more protracted, would dampen world trade, including Asian exports, but nothing on the scale seen in 2008. But trade only provides part of the linkage. The more important linkages come via the capital markets. The European Banking Authority’s requirement for banks to reach a tier 1 capital ratio of 9 percent by June of this year will require broad based deleveraging. As raising fresh capital is extremely difficult, one other avenue could be to shed assets, including assets abroad. Asia and other emerging markets, however, should not suffer unduly. Banks Can’t Afford to Exit Asia Most foreign banks are present in Asia via wholly owned subsidiaries, which cannot simply take capital back to their parent companies. Many of these subsidiaries are some of the most profitable parts of their businesses, and growing profits provides one important way to recapitalize. Shutting down all business lines in emerging markets would leave these banks without this important source of profits and force an even greater reliance on a weak domestic banking market in Europe. Furthermore, a plan to temporarily exit and re-enter may not be possible, as a foreign company that leaves town during hard times would not be quickly welcomed or permitted back. Indeed, even at the height of the post-Lehman financial crisis Asia did not see a wholesale pulling out of assets. But this deleveraging by many European banks is only part of the capital flow story. Fund Flow to Asia Will Continue Meanwhile, the ECB has launched its version of quantitative easing, which now augments the extraordinarily loose monetary policy of the U.S., Japan and U.K. We now see the most aggressive printing of money in modern times. While this aims to address domestic conditions, capital cannot be contained within national borders. Abundant global liquidity will continue to flow into Asian markets blessed with strong macro fundamentals—particularly as the region’s currencies still appear largely undervalued. Short-term volatility excluded, monetary policy in these four major economies will ultimately facilitate net capital inflows into Asia and many other asset markets and thus avoid the risk of a recession-induced credit crunch in Asia. Also, strong economic and political fundamentals support Asia. Unlike Europe or the U.S., Asia has built up plenty of room to provide fiscal stimulus and to lower interest rates in response to a worsening external environment. For example, the South Korean government’s debt levels have been slashed over the last decade and international reserves now well exceed levels seen before the global financial crisis. And the largest countries like China, India and Indonesia can count on a robust and resilient domestic demand to counter external demand weakness. A euro zone disintegration would be as calamitous as it is unlikely. On the other hand, the far more probable scenario of painful deleveraging by European banks and weak European growth, while a serious setback for Europe, will likely have far more modest and manageable global spillovers. The world economy is used to powering ahead without much help from European demand. It will do so this time as well. And Asian markets, with their strong market fundamentals and unparalleled future growth prospects, will continue to lead the charge.

#### Sq exports already stabilizing Europe

**Medlock, 12** -- Baker Institute Energy and Resource Economics fellow

(Kenneth, PhD in economics from Rice University, Rice University economics professor, Baker Institute Energy Forum’s natural gas program director, International Association for Energy Economics council member, United States Association for Energy Economics President for Academic Affairs, member of the American Economic Association and the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, "US LNG Exports: Truth and Consequence," 8-10-12, bakerinstitute.org/publications/US%20LNG%20Exports%20-%20Truth%20and%20Consequence%20Final\_Aug12-1.pdf, accessed 8-16-12, mss)

When considering international natural gas trade, it is important to recognize that the issue is indeed international. Thus, we must not only consider what is happening in North America; we must also consider what is happening abroad. For one, the emergence of shale gas in the United States has **already** had an impact on natural gas markets in Europe and Asia. LNG supplies whose development was anchored to the belief that the United States would be a **premium market** have been **diverted** to European and Asian buyers. As discussed in Medlock, Jaffe, and Hartley (2011), 1 this has presented consumers in Europe with an alternative to Russian and North African pipeline supplies, and it is exerting pressure on the status quo of indexing gas sales to the price of petroleum products. In fact, Russia has already accepted lower prices for its natural gas and is even allowing a portion of its sales in Europe to be indexed to spot natural gas markets, or regional market hubs, rather than oil prices. This change in pricing terms signals a major **paradigm shift** in Europe, and could be the harbinger that oil-indexation will eventually become a thing of the past. In fact, as natural gas becomes an increasingly fungible commodity, which would be the case as the volume of global natural gas trade increases, the paradigm of oilindexation will come under increasing pressure. This is an important factor when considering the current profit margin available to potential LNG exports.

And, trade is not key to economic interdependence

Streeten 1(Paul, Professor Emeritus of Economics at Boston University and Founder and Chairman of the journal World Development, Finance and Development, Vol 38, No 2, June)

Trade is, of course, only one, and not the most important, of many manifestations of economic interdependence. Others are the flow of factors of production—capital, technology, enterprise, and various types of labor—across frontiers and the exchange of assets, the acquisition of legal rights, and the international flows of information and knowledge. The global flow of foreign exchange has reached the incredible figure of $2 trillion per day, 98 percent of which is speculative. The multinational corporation has become an important agent of technological innovation and technology transfer. In 1995, the sales of multinationals amounted to $7 trillion, with these companies' sales outside their home countries growing 20-30 percent faster than exports.

Interdependence does not solve war—both world wars disprove this

**Copeland 96** (Dale, Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, International Security, Spring)

Liberals argue that economic interdependence lowers the likelihood of war by increasing the value of trading over the alternative of aggression: interdependent states would rather trade than invade. As long as high levels of interdependence can be maintained, liberals assert, we have reason for optimism. Realists dismiss the liberal argument, arguing that high interdependence increases rather than decreases the probability of war. In anarchy, states must constantly worry about their security. Accordingly, interdependence - meaning mutual dependence and thus vulnerability - gives states an incentive to initiate war, if only to ensure continued access to necessary materials and goods. The unsatisfactory nature of both liberal and realist theories is shown by their difficulties in explaining the run-ups to the two World Wars. **The period up to World War I exposes a glaring anomaly for liberal theory: the European powers had reached unprecedented levels of trade, yet that did not prevent them from going to** war. Realists certainly have the correlation right - the war was preceded by high interdependence - but trade levels had been high for the previous thirty years; hence, even if interdependence was a necessary condition for the war, it was not sufficient. **At first glance, the period from 1920 to 1940 seems to support liberalism** over realism. In the 1920s, interdependence was high, and the world was essentially peaceful; in the 1930s, as entrenched protectionism caused interdependence to fall, international tension rose to the point of world war. Yet the two most aggressive states in the system during the 1930s, Germany and Japan, were also the most highly dependent despite their efforts towards autarchy, relying on other states, including other great powers, for critical raw materials. Realism thus seems correct in arguing that high dependence may lead to conflict, as states use war to ensure access to vital goods. Realism's problem with the interwar era, however, is that Germany and Japan had been even more dependent in the 1920s, yet they sought war only in the late 1930s when their dependence, although still significant, had fallen.

Trade does not solve war—globalized trade reduces the deterrent value of trade suspension which insulates aggressor states from punishment—this is the opposite of their interdependence arguments

Goldstone 7(P.R., PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a non-resident research fellow at the Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University, AlterNet, September 25, http://www.alternet.org/audits/62848/?page=entire)

Many hope trade will constrain or perhaps pacify a rising China, resurgent Russia, and proliferation-minded Iran, as it well may. Nonetheless, any prudent analysis must incorporate caveats drawn from states' particular political economy of security policy**. In non-democratic states, however important global markets may be to the economy in aggregate, elites will be most sensitive to sectoral interests of their specific power base. This mismatch can cause systematic distortions in their ability to interpret other states' strategic signals correctly when genuine conflicts of interest emerge** with a nation more domestically constrained. **Leadership elites drawn from domestic-oriented, uncompetitive, or non-tradable constituencies will tend to discount deterrent signals sent by trading partners** whose own domestic institutions favor those commerce-oriented interests, believing such interests make partners less likely to fulfill their threats. For example, one reason the BJP government of India decided to achieve an open nuclear weapons capability was that its small-business, domestic-oriented heart constituency was both less vulnerable to trade sanctions and less willing to believe that the US would either impose or long sustain such sanctions, given its own increased economic interests in India. Sometimes, deterrent signals may not be sent at all, since one nation's governing coalition may include commerce-dependent groups whose interests prevent state leaders from actually undertaking necessary balancing responses or issuing potent signals of resolve in the first place; the result can be fatally muddled strategy and even war -- as witness the series of weak attempts before the First World War by finance-dominated Britain to deter "Iron and Rye"-dominated Germany. The emergence of truly global markets makes it all the less plausible under most circumstances that a revisionist state will be unable to find some alternative source of resources or outlet for its goods. Ironically, the more the international economy resembles a true global marketplace rather than an oligopolistic economic forum, the less likely it would appear that aggressors must inevitably suffer lasting retaliatory cut-offs in trade. There will always be someone else with the capability

# 2NC – Horse Trade Counterplan

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#### Even if nuclear war causes extinction, warming outweighs

Scheffran et al 2011

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A nuclear war would result from short-term decisions of a small group of political and military leaders. It may be fought in a time span from hours to days and decisions are made within hours, even minutes. The consequences are felt within the same time span, e.g. a nuclear explosion can eradicate a whole city within seconds, but there are also long-term consequences spanning multiple generations, e.g. due to radioactive fallout. For comparison, climate change occurs over long timescales and gradually undermines the living conditions of humanity and other life on earth over an extended period. Decisions on climate change have an impact decades and centuries later and can hardly be attributed to anyone in particular. Nevertheless, extreme weather events such as hurricanes and tornados or floods and landslides may occur on rather short notice and affect millions of people who are unable to get out of harm’s way in time. With the possibility of abrupt climate change, a sequence of cascading events and tipping points could make humanity feel the drastic changes within decades (Lenton, et al. 2008). Spatial scale | Nuclear proliferation is a global problem like climate change, even though the sources and impacts of either problem occur on a local scale. Nuclear proliferation and terrorism are driven by regional security problems and power structures. Global warming is caused by local emissions that accumulate in the atmosphere to induce global change which in turn affects ecological and social systems locally. While an all-out nuclear war can lead to human extinction, this is more unlikely for global warming because the consequences can be moderated by adaptive capacities that reduce the vulnerability of affected systems. Despite large uncertainties about the magnitude, frequency and distribution of risks, climate change is now widely recognized, including the impact of human behaviour on it. The likelihood of nuclear war increases with nuclear proliferation and hawkish doctrines, but can hardly be quantified. Who is responsible? The sources of climate change are our lifestyles which cause nature to ―respond‖ in accordance with natural laws. The five initial nuclear weapon states are leading in military expenditure and are among the world’s largest carbon emitters. Different from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is a discriminatory regime that puts more restraints on the non-nuclear weapon states than on those with nuclear weapons, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) recognizes a universal obligation to prevent dangerous climate change, and assigns the greatest responsibility to the polluters. Who is affected? During the Cold War nuclear weapons were largely directed against ideological antagonists who possessed the same type of weapons. The end of the Cold War and the spread of nuclear weapons caused the bilateral nuclear threat between the Western and Eastern bloc to fragment, altered the geopolitical landscape in several regions and increased the stakes in related conflicts. By comparison, global warming is not a determined threat against competitors but affects many communities on the planet. The causes and consequences of climate change can be distributed quite asymmetrically across different regions, raising questions of equity and injustice. While the powerful countries contribute the most to the risks, most affected are the weak and the vulnerable, in particular impoverished peoples in developing countries. Ultimately, by undermining human security, large-scale climate change will likely also affect the security of powerful nations, and protection is a costly endeavor Who is the enemy? In traditional security thinking there are determined enemies that seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction, notably nuclear weapons, to challenge the powerful nations. While nuclear explosions can be attributed to an intentional act by a determined adversary (provided they are not accidental), motivations and perceptions are different for climate change, which is involuntary and not caused by a particular enemy. Global warming results from all human beings’ greenhouse gas emissions, and at the same time is affecting humans across the globe by its impact. For those who are suffering the most from climate change, those who contribute more to the problem can be seen as more significant ―threats‖. Using this kind of security thinking is, however, questionable and distracts attention from the causes and possible solutions to the climate problem, which is more an environmental than a security issue (Scheffran 2011).

#### And, warming will make fossil fules an ineffective energy option---turns the case

Rogers 12 (Will Rogers is the Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). “Climate Change Could Disrupt Efforts to Promote Energy Security” http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2012/06/climate-change-could-disrupt-efforts-promote-energy-security.html)

Countries are increasingly investing in new energy projects to boost domestic energy production and shrink the demand for foreign energy imports. However, climate change may undermine efforts by countries to promote assured access to energy, including with nuclear power, hydroelectric dams and other energy projects that are tied to water resources. A new study by the journal Nature Climate Change cautions that energy production from thermoelectric power plants could become increasingly constrained as a result of climate change. On the one hand, climate change is expected to warm river and other water resources generally used by thermoelectric power stations (such as nuclear and fossil-fuelled plants) for cooling. According to the study, the United States relies on thermoelectric power stations for about 91 percent of total energy generation (compared to 78 percent in Europe). “During recent warm, dry summers in 2003, 2006 and 2009 several thermoelectric power plants in Europe were forced to reduce production, because of restricted availability of cooling water,” the study found. “In the US a similar event in 2007–2008 caused several power plants to reduce production, or shut down for several days owing to a lack of surface water for cooling and environmental restrictions on thermal discharges.” In February, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists published a related report on the impact of climate change on U.S. nuclear power production. “The one-two punch of power production and climate change has already made some rivers so hot during the summer that they can no longer provide adequate cooling at power plants without exceeding legal limits on temperature,” the report stated. “During the past two summers, the Tennessee Valley Authority had to reduce power production by 50 percent at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant because the water in the Tennessee River -- where the plant's cooling water is discharged -- was already at 90 degrees.” Moreover, climate-induced precipitation decline could have an effect on hydroelectric production by reducing river flow. This challenge may be particularly acute for countries that rely increasingly on hydroelectric dams, like China. In CNAS’s January 2012 report on the South China Sea I wrote about how this phenomenon is undermining China’s efforts to increase domestic energy production and may be reinforcing its assertive behavior for energy resources in the South China Sea: [D]roughts in China offer a stark example of how broader climate trends may undermine the nation’s ability to diversify energy resources and invigorate its efforts to seek fossil fuels in the South China Sea. Although China generated approximately 16 percent of its electricity from hydroelectric dams in 2009 and plans to nearly double its hydroelectric capacity by 2020, China’s hydroelectric power is projected to decline by 30 to 40 percent in the last quarter of 2011 because of a prolonged drought in parts of the country. However, this recent decline is not a unique event; in recent years, drought has reduced hydroelectric output even as China has been expanding its hydroelectric capacity. Scientific models suggest that climate change is likely to exacerbate drought in East and Southeast Asia by affecting precipitation trends. Thus, these conditions are likely to get worse, undermining China’s ability to generate renewable electricity from hydroelectric power and potentially reinforcing its demand for fossil fuels, including resources in the South China Sea. Policymakers will need to think about ways to adapt thermoelectric power projects in an era of climate change. For example, policymakers should consider solutions to help new power plants adapt to an environment where access to cooling water is increasingly scarce. According to The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, some proposals are already being developed to adapt to this reality. “One such alternative might be a system like the one used at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station in Arizona, the only nuclear power plant in the world -- so far -- that was not built next to a large body of water,” according to the report. “Palo Verde uses treated sewage water from Phoenix, instead of fresh water, to meet its cooling needs.” The bottom line is that the toll climate change could have on energy production reinforces a key principle that policymakers must adhere to when making energy policy decisions: climate change and energy are inextricably linked. Policymakers will become increasingly hard pressed to promote energy security without taking steps to both mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change. The best course of action is for policymakers to promote policies that have both energy and climate security closely in mind.

### XT: Economy/Competitiveness !

#### Renewable energy investment is key to the economy and innovation---comparatively better than the aff

DiPasquale 11 (Christina C. DiPasquale is Associate Director of Press Relations at the Center for American Progress. Kate Gordon is Vice President for Energy Policy at the Center. “Top 10 Reasons Why Green Jobs Are Vital to Our Economy” http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/top\_ten\_green\_jobs.html)

Green jobs are integral to any effort to jumpstart our economy and reduce as rapidly as possible our 9.1 percent unemployment rate. The rapid growth of green jobs will boost demand in our economy by reducing unemployment, make America more competitive in the global economy, and protect our public health—all of which will result in greater economic productivity and long-term economic prosperity. Here are the top 10 reasons why this is the case today and into the future: 1. There are already 2.7 million jobs across the clean economy. Clean energy is already proving to be larger job creation engine than the heavily subsidized fossil-fuels sector, putting Americans back to work in a lackluster economy. 2. Across a range of clean energy projects, including renewable energy, transit, and energy efficiency, for every million dollars spent, 16.7 green jobs are created. That is over three times the 5.3 jobs per million dollars that are created from the same spending on fossil-fuel industries. 3. The clean energy sector is growing at a rate of 8.3 percent. Solar thermal energy expanded by 18.4 percent annually from 2003 to 2010, along with solar photovoltaic power by 10.7 percent, and biofuels by 8.9 percent over the same period. Meanwhile, the U.S. wind energy industry saw 35 percent average annual growth over the past five years, accounting for 35 percent of new U.S. power capacity in that period, according to the 2010 U.S. Wind Industry Annual Market Report. As a whole, the clean energy sector’s average growth rate of 8.3 percent annually during this period was nearly double the growth rate of the overall economy during that time. 4. The production of cleaner cars and trucks is employing over 150,000 workers across the United States today. These job numbers are likely to increase as improved car and light truck standards recently announced by President Barack Obama will require more skilled employees and encourage further investment. 5. Median wages are 13 percent higher in green energy careers than the economy average. Median salaries for green jobs are $46,343, or about $7,727 more than the median wages across the broader economy. As an added benefit, nearly half of these jobs employ workers with a less than a four-year college degree, which accounts for a full 70 percent of our workforce. 6. Green jobs are made in America, spurring innovation with more U.S. content than other industries. Most of the products used in energy efficiency retrofits are more than 90 percent made in America. Sheet metal for ductwork is over 99 percent domestically sourced, as are vinyl windows (98 percent) and rigid foam insulation (more than 95 percent). Even major mechanical equipment such as furnaces (94 percent) and air conditioning and heat pumps (82 percent) are predominantly American made. 7. We have a positive trade balance in solar power components such as photovoltaic components and solar heating and cooling components of $1.9 billion, and are exporting components to China. Contrast this with the oil industry, where in 2010 alone we imported over $250 billion in petroleum-related products. As our nation’s basic manufacturing base declines, we risk losing our place in the forefront of innovation if we don’t invest in advanced manufacturing in the green sector. 8. Three separate programs for energy efficiency retrofits have employed almost 25,000 Americans in three months. The Weatherization Assistance Program, Energy Efficiency Block Grant Program, and State Energy Programs have collectively upgraded over half a million buildings since the programs began to ramp up from April 1, 2011 and June 30, 2011, providing immediate new and sustainable job opportunities to tens of thousands of construction workers eagerly searching for work. 9. Clean energy jobs are better for U.S. small businesses. Specialty construction companies that perform energy retrofits show very high rates of small business participation in the construction. Ninety-one percent of the firms involved in retrofits are mall businesses with less than 20 employees. 10. An abundance of jobs in the green sector are manufacturing jobs with an upward career track. Forty-one percent of the nation’s green jobs offer medium to long-term career building and training opportunities, and 26 percent of green jobs are in the manufacturing sector, compared to 9 percent in the traditional economy. The bottom line: Green jobs being created through smart investments in our energy infrastructure are expanding employment opportunities while reducing pollution of our air and water, providing an alternative to foreign oil, and allowing us to export more American-made goods abroad.

Decline causes nuclear war

Kemp 2010

Geoffrey, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, pg. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

#### US technological dominance is key to hegemony

**Khalilzad, 1995** (Washington Quarterly, lexis)

The United States is unlikely to preserve its military and technological dominance if the U.S. economy declines seriously. In such an environment, the domestic economic and political base for global leadership would diminish and the United States would probably incrementally withdraw from the world, become inward-looking, and abandon more and more of its external interests. As the United States weakened, others would try to fill the Vacuum. **To sustain and improve its economic strength, the United States must maintain its technological lead in the economic realm**. Its success will depend on the choices it makes. In the past, developments such as the agricultural and industrial revolutions produced fundamental changes positively affecting the relative position of those who were able to take advantage of them and negatively affecting those who did not. Some argue that the world may be at the beginning of another such transformation, which will shift the sources of wealth and the relative position of classes and nations. **If the United States fails to recognize the change and adapt its institutions, its relative position will necessarily worsen.**

#### The impact is global nuclear war

Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

### 2NC Turns case-Energy Security

#### The CP is key to energy diversification-We control the biggest internal link into energy security-dwarfs the affs solvency

[Jenkins](http://thebreakthrough.org/people/profile/Jesse-Jenkins) [and Borofsky](http://thebreakthrough.org/people/profile/Yael-Borofsky)-Breakthrough Institute-4/10

After "Drill, Baby, Drill," Obama Should Embrace Another GOP Energy Plan

http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/after\_drill\_baby\_drill\_obama\_s

Don't believe it? Here's the breakdown... While much of the rhetoric used to advocate for offshore drilling deals with the threat of rising prices at the pump and our nation's energy security, EIA projections show that "access to the Pacific, Atlantic, and eastern Gulf [offshore] regions would not have a significant impact on domestic crude oil and natural gas production or prices before 2030." At that point, access to the new portions of outer continental shelf (OCS) previously off-limits would cut gasoline prices at the pump by just three cents, a clearly insignificant step towards "energy independence." What could have a significant impact on our energy security, however, would be to invest the hundreds of billions in potential federal revenues from oil and gas royalties to accelerate clean tech innovation and deployment, helping America develop the clean and affordable energy sources needed to truly diversify our energy mix and secure our freedom from oil.

#### Renewable energy investment is key to the economy and innovation---comparatively better than the aff

DiPasquale 11 (Christina C. DiPasquale is Associate Director of Press Relations at the Center for American Progress. Kate Gordon is Vice President for Energy Policy at the Center. “Top 10 Reasons Why Green Jobs Are Vital to Our Economy” http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/top\_ten\_green\_jobs.html)

Green jobs are integral to any effort to jumpstart our economy and reduce as rapidly as possible our 9.1 percent unemployment rate. The rapid growth of green jobs will boost demand in our economy by reducing unemployment, make America more competitive in the global economy, and protect our public health—all of which will result in greater economic productivity and long-term economic prosperity. Here are the top 10 reasons why this is the case today and into the future: 1. There are already 2.7 million jobs across the clean economy. Clean energy is already proving to be larger job creation engine than the heavily subsidized fossil-fuels sector, putting Americans back to work in a lackluster economy. 2. Across a range of clean energy projects, including renewable energy, transit, and energy efficiency, for every million dollars spent, 16.7 green jobs are created. That is over three times the 5.3 jobs per million dollars that are created from the same spending on fossil-fuel industries. 3. The clean energy sector is growing at a rate of 8.3 percent. Solar thermal energy expanded by 18.4 percent annually from 2003 to 2010, along with solar photovoltaic power by 10.7 percent, and biofuels by 8.9 percent over the same period. Meanwhile, the U.S. wind energy industry saw 35 percent average annual growth over the past five years, accounting for 35 percent of new U.S. power capacity in that period, according to the 2010 U.S. Wind Industry Annual Market Report. As a whole, the clean energy sector’s average growth rate of 8.3 percent annually during this period was nearly double the growth rate of the overall economy during that time. 4. The production of cleaner cars and trucks is employing over 150,000 workers across the United States today. These job numbers are likely to increase as improved car and light truck standards recently announced by President Barack Obama will require more skilled employees and encourage further investment. 5. Median wages are 13 percent higher in green energy careers than the economy average. Median salaries for green jobs are $46,343, or about $7,727 more than the median wages across the broader economy. As an added benefit, nearly half of these jobs employ workers with a less than a four-year college degree, which accounts for a full 70 percent of our workforce. 6. Green jobs are made in America, spurring innovation with more U.S. content than other industries. Most of the products used in energy efficiency retrofits are more than 90 percent made in America. Sheet metal for ductwork is over 99 percent domestically sourced, as are vinyl windows (98 percent) and rigid foam insulation (more than 95 percent). Even major mechanical equipment such as furnaces (94 percent) and air conditioning and heat pumps (82 percent) are predominantly American made. 7. We have a positive trade balance in solar power components such as photovoltaic components and solar heating and cooling components of $1.9 billion, and are exporting components to China. Contrast this with the oil industry, where in 2010 alone we imported over $250 billion in petroleum-related products. As our nation’s basic manufacturing base declines, we risk losing our place in the forefront of innovation if we don’t invest in advanced manufacturing in the green sector. 8. Three separate programs for energy efficiency retrofits have employed almost 25,000 Americans in three months. The Weatherization Assistance Program, Energy Efficiency Block Grant Program, and State Energy Programs have collectively upgraded over half a million buildings since the programs began to ramp up from April 1, 2011 and June 30, 2011, providing immediate new and sustainable job opportunities to tens of thousands of construction workers eagerly searching for work. 9. Clean energy jobs are better for U.S. small businesses. Specialty construction companies that perform energy retrofits show very high rates of small business participation in the construction. Ninety-one percent of the firms involved in retrofits are mall businesses with less than 20 employees. 10. An abundance of jobs in the green sector are manufacturing jobs with an upward career track. Forty-one percent of the nation’s green jobs offer medium to long-term career building and training opportunities, and 26 percent of green jobs are in the manufacturing sector, compared to 9 percent in the traditional economy. The bottom line: Green jobs being created through smart investments in our energy infrastructure are expanding employment opportunities while reducing pollution of our air and water, providing an alternative to foreign oil, and allowing us to export more American-made goods abroad.

### 2nc at: we cause renewables

#### No reason to wait if warming is really coming

#### They are not a certain increase in renewables

#### R+D and innovation are key

Stepp 12 (Matthew Stepp is a Senior Analyst with the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) specializing in climate change and clean energy policy. His research interests include clean energy technology development, climate science policy development, transportation policy, and the role innovation has in economic growth. “The Future of Global Climate Policy: Clean Energy Innovation Imperative (Part 3)”

The bulwark of an effective energy innovation system is the aggressive pursuit of new products, new services, performance improvements and cost declines across each stage of innovation and technology maturation. It includes major support for R&D for both radical new clean technologies like vehicle batteries that travel 500 miles or more on a single charge as well as includes steady incremental improvements in existing designs like on-shore wind turbines. The ecosystem supports the accelerated commercialization and demonstration of new clean technologies so potential breakthrough ideas don’t collect dust on a laboratory’s shelf. And the ecosystem includes deployment policies that should be explicitly designed to ensure that every dollar invested provides the best incentives for further innovation and cost declines. Deployment policies must play a key role in creating markets for clean energy, but we must ensure that those markets have the right structure and offer the right incentives to demand and reward continual improvements in the price and performance of clean technologies.

The ultimate goal of this system is to use limited public investments to support a variety of clean energy technologies on a path to subsidy independence and true cost competitiveness with fossil fuels, as quickly as possible. It ensures we not only smartly deploy clean technologies today, but make these technologies affordable enough for the rapid, widespread, global adoption needed to drastically cut emissions.

As it stands, America’s clean energy innovation ecosystem has significant weaknesses and is not running at top gear. The goal of climate advocates should be to strengthen the innovation ecosystem so it can develop cheaper options in a small fraction of the time it took solar PV to decrease in cost. If we take our climate outlook seriously, we have to focus just as seriously on efforts to strengthen and support the energy innovation ecosystem to make clean energy cheap. It’s our only realistic way to limit any further potentially dangerous climate change than what we are already locked ourselves into.

### A2: Perm-Do Both

---The permutation allows Congress to pocket the concession-It isn’t a horse trade

Plummer-New Republic-10/4/10

<http://www.tnr.com/blog/the-vine/78147/did-the-white-house-kill-the-climate-bill>

Did The White House Kill The Climate Bill?

In this week's New Yorker, Ryan Lizza has a long, truly excellent reported piece on how the climate bill died in the Senate. The big question is to what extent the White House deserves the blame: “I believe Barack Obama understands that fifty years from now no one’s going to know about health care,” the lobbyist said. “Economic historians will know that we had a recession at this time. Everybody is going to be thinking about whether Barack Obama was the James Buchanan of climate change.” Now, as Jonathan Zasloff notes, this isn't the most precise historical analogy of all time. Buchanan took paralysis and incompetence to a whole different level. And Obama is hardly the only (or even the main) person at fault for the collapse of the climate bill. Still, as Lizza's piece details, the White House did make a number of serious blunders during the climate-bill fight. Perhaps the biggest was when Obama announced that he would open up new coastal areas for offshore drilling and issue new loan guarantees for nuclear power. Both were seen as moves to placate conservatives. Trouble was, it was a terrible negotiating tactic—Lindsey Graham, John Kerry, and Joe Lieberman were trying to dangle those provisions to lure Republicans votes for their climate bill. Instead, Obama just gave them away for free. Worse, the White House didn't even consult with the three senators before undercutting them.

#### ---The permutation is theoretically illegitimate—EITHER

#### A. The perm severs the unconditional and immediate implementation of the plan by allowing the Congress to veto the plan’s passage. This is a voting issue because severance allows the affirmative to dodge all negative disad links and makes the aff a moving target, which destroys negative ground

#### Or

#### B. The perm is intrinsic because it adds the element of nonbinding consultation which is not a part of the counterplan or the plan. Intrinsicness is a voting issue because it allows the aff to add an infinite number of planks to the plan that makes stable negative ground impossible.

#### --Leveraging the plan to garner support for clean energy investment is key---the permutation forfeits the bargaining chip

Muro-fellow Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings-5/24/10

Offshore Drilling: Room for Compromise in Pursuit of Clean Energy?

<http://www.brookings.edu/up-front/posts/2010/05/24-offshore-drilling-muro>

It goes without saying that the nation should legislate no new commitments to offshore oil drilling without first getting to the bottom of the colossal BP disaster in the Gulf of Mexico. That means investigators, lawmakers, and the public at large need to really grapple with the Deepwater Horizon mess. In this respect, lawmakers need to understand what technical things went wrong and get a grip on what regulatory failures played a role. But beyond that—and hardest—all of us need to take from this debacle a little more serious appreciation of the unavoidable costs of our oil addiction. Along these lines, it remains quite mystifying that President Obama only last weekend began to tie what Brad Plumer over at The New Republic's blog, The Vine, calls “the nasty side effects of our fossil fuel addiction”—from massive spills to the risks of catastrophic climate change—to a broader case for energy reform and moving the country away from oil. This is a teachable moment after all. Which brings us to the drifting Kerry-Lieberman climate and energy bill, now stuck in limbo in the Senate, as reports Darren Samuelsohn of ClimateWire. Strange to say, the much-debated offshore drilling provisions in Kerry-Lieberman represent a critical opportunity to act on the current teachable moment and tie further fossil fuel use once and for all to energy system transformation. How’s that? Well, providing appropriate safety and regulatory provisions can be fashioned, the Senate bill’s drilling title represents an important opportunity to make a necessary point as well as generate substantial revenue to drive the energy system innovation needed to help the nation decarbonize its economy and wean itself from fossil fuels. To be sure, it’s unclear appropriate safeguards for further drilling can be designed and equally unclear whether the Kerry-Lieberman bill will actually move. But if the legislation does proceed, any concessions on drilling in the bill should be strongly tied to a hard requirement that any lease revenue associated with offshore drilling along the nation’s coasts be invested directly in energy efficiency and clean energy innovation. Such a link, as it happens, was first proposed by a 2009 GOP plan to put hundreds of billions of new oil and gas royalties into a trust fund to accelerate clean energy innovation that would help make clean energy cheap and truly help wean America from its carbon dependency. But at any rate, such a stipulation makes powerful practical as well as symbolic sense. Data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration show that, in terms of their oil and gas yield, "access to the Pacific, Atlantic, and eastern Gulf [offshore] regions would not have a significant impact on domestic crude oil and natural gas production or prices before 2030." However, as Jesse Jenkins and Yael Borofsky of the Breakthrough Institute have noted, what could make a difference would be to invest the tens of billions in potential federal revenue from oil and gas royalties in efforts to accelerate clean tech innovation and deployment and so help America develop the affordable clean energy sources needed to truly diversify its energy mix and secure our freedom from oil. In short, it’s not so much the oil and gas itself that would make a difference in addressing the nation’s energy needs but the potential associated revenue, which would help to address the nation’s serious need to find the wherewithal to apply from $15 billion to $25 billion a year, each and every year, to clean energy innovation activities. And if such a trade of drilling for cleantech revenue sounds mercenary, I plead guilty out of desperation. After all, as I noted during a panel session at last week’s compelling Brookings forum “Energy and Climate Change 2010: Back to the Future,” the nation has not done so well with providing for sufficient energy innovation, either through the regular appropriations process or through the allotment of cap-and-trade emission permit revenue within its “comprehensive” climate bills. In the former case, Congress simply comes up short on the dollar levels; in the latter case it keeps “giving away the store” with massive allowance giveaways that severely depress the stream of revenue available for public needs like clean energy innovation. Even now, the Kerry-Lieberman outline will hand some 37 percent of its offshore drilling lease revenue over to coastal states as a disastrous brand of ill-founded “revenue sharing.” In sum, we desperately need a set of major, dedicated revenue sources for clean energy R&D and deployment and offshore drilling revenue looks like one top candidate. Post-Deepwater Horizon, linking any sort of expanded drilling to clean energy transformation looks is a no-brainer that should be insisted upon.

More evidence

Muro-fellow Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings-5/10/10

Senate Climate Bill: Apply Big Revenue to Energy Innovation

<http://www.brookings.edu/up-front/posts/2010/05/10-climate-bill-muro>

Should Senate Democrats really try to pass an energy and climate bill this summer? Should offshore oil drilling be included? Who knows? Since nobody’s seen the details, I don’t know whether Senate Democrats should pursue a possible “comprehensive” energy and climate deal this year. Doubts abound, for sure, the BP oil spill has complicated things, and Brad Plumer over at the New Republic's blog, The Vine, has noted a ton of problems with earlier bill outlines. So we’ll just have to see what gets released, supposedly on Wednesday. For now nothing’s very clear. What is clear, though, is this: To get to a good bill senators need to deal properly with the revenue—whether from offshore oil drilling or pollution allowance auctions or whatever else is in the bill. And to do that they need to make sure a huge chunk of it gets applied to clean-energy research and development. Get that right and much else needn’t be perfect. Blow that, and the bill is likely not worth it. Now: How’s that again? Why do senators need to follow the money so closely? The bottom line is this: Putting a price on carbon, or regulating emissions, as we have written here on the Avenue and in this major report that was recently cited by New York Times columnist David Brooks, while absolutely necessary, will not be sufficient to address the nation’s climate problem and will, importantly, not put the U.S. in the position to seize the extraordinary opportunities that will come with rebuilding to global energy economy. Also necessary, as we keep saying, will be a major drive to promote large-scale technology breakthroughs. No matter how you measure it, U.S. government investment in clean energy R&D remains grossly inadequate. Right now clean energy R&D accounts for only around $3 billion a year. But if we’re going to see real progress in de-carbonizing the present economy and creating the next one this number should be closer to $15 billion and probably as much as $25 billion per year. So that’s the target: $15 to $25 billion a year is “the number”—the critical investment threshold for federal clean energy investment that must become a core benchmark for evaluating any and all federal climate, energy, or indeed appropriations deal making. So how, then, does the anticipated climate and energy bill from Sens. Kerry and Lieberman look by this standard? Even given the lack of a public bill text, the drift of discussions about revenue items that seem to be under consideration doesn’t reassure. First, that two-thirds of the revenues generated by auctioning off pollution allowances for utilities might be returned to consumers through local distribution companies raises concerns about giving away the store. Sure, this is a way to get something through the Senate by evening out the geographical disparities of energy use and bill impact, but it may not be fair to efficient places and, at any rate, it’s the slippery slope to blowing the revenue without taking care of essentials like clean energy investment. As to the current bugbear of drilling, it might conceivably be worthwhile as a way to reduce energy dependence a little, raise revenue, and buy fossil fuel interests’ support for emissions limits or renewables standards. However, the price of drilling’s inclusion should clearly be not just strict new drilling safeguards, but a hard link of drilling to clean technology innovation as well. That is, Senate dealmakers should in effect embrace the outline of a recent GOP plan to put hundreds of billions of new oil and gas royalties into a fund to accelerate clean energy innovation that would help make clean energy cheap and truly help wean America from its carbon dependency. Yet this too looks fraught this week, as discussions about where the revenue from taxing any new offshore drilling should go are if anything drifting more toward revenue sharing than R&D. Brad Plumer notes, for example, that Louisiana’s Mary Landrieu is now insisting that some of the money from drilling should go to the states that approve it and points out a story quoting her as saying: “There is not going to be and drilling unless there is revenue sharing.” In short, all of this sounds problematic. Once again, virtually every interest imaginable—the utilities, the drillers, the anti-drillers, the deficit hawks, the states, the regions, the environmentalists—is having its say but there’s little focus on applying adequate revenue to truly remaking the U.S. energy system. So: We’ll see.

#### ---The permutation is perceived as a last minute attempt to gain votes as opposed to genuine inclusion of Congress into the formation of policy

Lindsay-senior fellow brookings-2K

U.S. Congress, U.S. Department of State, Executive Branch, Foreign Policy, Governance

http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2000/winter\_usstatedepartment\_lindsay.aspx?p=1

Second, as the fate of the test ban treaty illustrates, presidents and their advisers must begin making the case for their foreign policy priorities to the public and Congress before they become controversial. Presidents enjoy a considerable advantage in framing how the public and Congress think about issues. That advantage holds, however, only when presidents act early. With the 1995 Mexican aid package and the replenishment of the IMF reserves, for example, the Clinton administration moved slowly in defining the issue. Its opponents showed no such hesitancy, denouncing both proposals as "bail outs" of profligate foreigners and imprudent speculators. The label stuck, and the administration found itself running uphill. In foreign policy as in football, playing catch-up is always harder to do. Yet presidents and their advisers can take comfort from public opinion polls that make it clear that an internationalist majority exists out there to be mobilized. Third, presidents and their advisers need to invest in personal relationships with members of Congress. Throughout the Cold War, executive branch officials typically ignored Congress until they faced a showdown vote. Then they couldnt consult enough. That strategy no longer works. The failed efforts to secure fast-track trade authority and to win Senate approval of the test ban treaty show that last-minute appeals to national security and calls for preserving presidential prerogative no longer move lawmakers. What complicates administration efforts to build ties to Congress is the sheer number of members who must be consulted. As the administration discovered with the battles over Mexican aid and UN arrears, congressional leaders frequently cannot deliver rank-and-file support for agreements they make. As a result, while proposals to formalize consultations between the president and the congressional leadership may do some good, they are a poor substitute for reaching out to a broad slice of the membership. These three suggestions are not magic bullets. Without a national consensus on America?s role abroad, foreign policy governance will always be fractious. Yet if presidents dont adapt their leadership styles to the changed conditions of post Cold War America, foreign policy gridlock is inevitable.

#### ---Key distinction between informing and consulting

Muskie-former secretary of state-90 *The Constitution and National Security*

 When Presidents wall themselves off from congressional advice and good counsel they invite damage to themselves and to the national interest they are sworn to uphold. Presidents need the advice of other elected officials as well as the advice of their inner circle: they need alternative points of view not a confirmation of their institutional or personal biases. The surest way for a President to foster narrowness and resentment on Capitol Hill is to exclude members of Congress from the process of making important decisions. I am concerned about true consultation, not notification after the fact.

#### ---Genuine consultation is important for branch relations EVEN if Congress supports the plan

Say Anything 3/30/09

http://sayanythingblog.com/entry/king\_obama\_canned\_gm\_ceo\_without\_even\_consulting\_congress/

What does Obama need Congress for? He’s The One. 3/30/09

Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), a fierce defender of the auto industry, says he was disappointed to see Rick Wagoner pushed out as chief executive of General Motors. Levin also says there was no input from Congress on the Wagoner matter, and that President Barack Obama had already made up his mind when he informed a select group of lawmakers of his auto industry restructuring plans. “There wasn’t much point in arguing whether it was fair or unfair,” Levin said, since the matter had already been decided. Levin, who learned of the plan Sunday night in a conference call with the president, said Monday that one of the most “striking points” of Obama’s decision was that he is “absolutely committed” to seeing U.S. automakers lead the world in the next generation of cars. Personally, I think Wagoner deserved to go. But the fact that the government, the President in fact acting unilaterally with an unprecedented amount of executive power, just canned a private sector executive is troubling.

#### ---Only genuine consultation can build support for the plan in Congress

The Bulletin's Frontrunner 12/7/2K

Issues Seen Key For Bipartisan Approach. In a Bloomington Herald-Times column (12/6), former Rep. Lee Hamilton said that while "we shouldn't expect a paradise of bipartisanship" in Washington when "every significant issue facing the White House and Congress will be scrutinized for its impact on the 2002 congressional elections," we "also shouldn't underestimate public pressure to make progress on reforming Social Security, addressing the growing trade deficit, finding a way to meet the health-care needs of the country's 43 million uninsured citizens, and tackling other urgent issues that will crop up during the next few years, especially if there is an economic downturn." The "simple truth is the president cannot run the country alone. If he wants to make a record for his administration, he has no choice but to find points of accord with Congress." A president who "finds a way of forging consensus in Congress by knitting together contrasting views is also a president whose policies have a good chance of generating strong public support." If the president "doesn't lay out a clear and realistic agenda and then stick to it, he'll be buffeted every which way," but to "make progress on his agenda, he must also make a real effort to consult with Congress." Hamilton added, "Real consultations take work. It means that Congress and the White House must sit down and talk before decisions are made. It means holding conversations among leaders-congressional leaders of both parties, the president and his top advisors."

### A2: Perm-Lie

#### B. Leaks-Links to our net benefits and guts solvency

Pillar-National Interest- 6/8/12 Leaky Thinking About Secrecy

<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/leaky-thinking-about-secrecy-7033>

The leadership of the House and Senate intelligence committees issued a joint statement Wednesday that expressed concern over recent leaks of information about sensitive activities overseas, called on the executive branch to do more to detect and deter leaks, and declared an intention to consider new legislation that somehow would help to combat leaking. The committees summoned Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and FBI director Robert Mueller to discuss the matter on Thursday, and there is talk about the possible need for a special counsel. I wish the committees well. If anyone has any good ideas for new procedures or penalties to ameliorate the problem, bravo. But as the committee leaders put it with understatement, “the problem of leaks of classified information is not new.” The sad fact is that most leaks are inherently difficult to investigate and police. Meanwhile, the revelations and accusations that stimulated this statement involve some misconceptions about government secrecy and some unhelpful conflation of different issues. Even though Democratic and Republican leaders agreed on the committee statement, the issue of recent revelations about national-security matters has been, like just about everything else in Washington, politicized. With a Democratic administration in office, it has been the Republicans' turn to accuse the administration of disclosing national-security accomplishments as a way of burnishing President Obama's public image in an election year—which the president forcefully denied in comments to reporters on Friday. The previous Republican administration was no stranger to politically motivated disclosure, the most notorious example of which involved revelations about the identity and status of a covert CIA officer as part of an effort to discredit the message from her retired ambassador husband, who had written publicly about the phoniness of one aspect of the Bush administration's public brief about Iraq. In one of the recent cases, the Obama administration held a conference call with outside commentators about a foiled terrorist plot but failed to inform the intelligence committees about the plot until after it was reported in the media. This was an embarrassing misstep that no doubt accounts for the Democratic as well as Republican leaders signing on to the sort of statement the intelligence committees released. Public revelations reflect a highly selective slice of national-security matters, but the selection is often not a matter of puffery about an administration's accomplishments or other high-level manipulation. Failures are more likely than successes to become publicly known, given the inherently more visible public footprint of many failures. And many more revelations reflect the personal agenda (or neuroses, or resentments) of an individual leaker.

### A2: Perm-Do the CP

#### ---And, substantial reduction implies real or tangible reduction-the permutation is a conditional not substantive reduction.

Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, 1996 (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/substantially)

1 a : of or relating to substance b : not illusory : having merit substantial constitutional claim> c : having importance or significance : MATERIAL substantial step had not been taken toward commission of the crime —W. Railroad LaFave and A. W. Scott, Junior>

2 : considerable in quantity : significantly great substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter —U.S. Code> —compare DE MINIMIS — sub•stan•ti•al•i•ty /-"stan-chE-'a-l&-tE/ noun — sub•stan•tial•ly adverb

#### ---And, should is mandatory

A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, Bryan A Garner, scholar of the English Language, March 2001

Should. Oddly, should, like may, q.v., is sometimes used to create mandatory standards, as in the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct. In that code, in which “[t]he canons...establish mandatory standards unless otherwise indicated,” six of the seven canons begin, “A Judge should...” See ought (b) & shall.

#### ---Should implies probability

Google Dictionary, 2011

Used to indicate what is probable

#### ---And, Resolved means to make a firm deicison

[Allwords.com](http://Allwords.com/) 2003

http://www.allwords.com/query.php?SearchType=3&Keyword=Resolved&goquery=Find+it%21&Language=ENG

1. To decide firmly or to determine to do it.

Form: resolve on something (usually)

Form: resolve to do something

### 2NC Turns case-Energy Security

#### The CP is key to energy diversification-We control the biggest internal link into energy security-dwarfs the affs solvency

[Jenkins](http://thebreakthrough.org/people/profile/Jesse-Jenkins) [and Borofsky](http://thebreakthrough.org/people/profile/Yael-Borofsky)-Breakthrough Institute-4/10

After "Drill, Baby, Drill," Obama Should Embrace Another GOP Energy Plan

http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/after\_drill\_baby\_drill\_obama\_s

Don't believe it? Here's the breakdown... While much of the rhetoric used to advocate for offshore drilling deals with the threat of rising prices at the pump and our nation's energy security, EIA projections show that "access to the Pacific, Atlantic, and eastern Gulf [offshore] regions would not have a significant impact on domestic crude oil and natural gas production or prices before 2030." At that point, access to the new portions of outer continental shelf (OCS) previously off-limits would cut gasoline prices at the pump by just three cents, a clearly insignificant step towards "energy independence." What could have a significant impact on our energy security, however, would be to invest the hundreds of billions in potential federal revenues from oil and gas royalties to accelerate clean tech innovation and deployment, helping America develop the clean and affordable energy sources needed to truly diversify our energy mix and secure our freedom from oil.

#### Renewable energy investment is key to the economy and innovation---comparatively better than the aff

DiPasquale 11 (Christina C. DiPasquale is Associate Director of Press Relations at the Center for American Progress. Kate Gordon is Vice President for Energy Policy at the Center. “Top 10 Reasons Why Green Jobs Are Vital to Our Economy” http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/top\_ten\_green\_jobs.html)

Green jobs are integral to any effort to jumpstart our economy and reduce as rapidly as possible our 9.1 percent unemployment rate. The rapid growth of green jobs will boost demand in our economy by reducing unemployment, make America more competitive in the global economy, and protect our public health—all of which will result in greater economic productivity and long-term economic prosperity. Here are the top 10 reasons why this is the case today and into the future: 1. There are already 2.7 million jobs across the clean economy. Clean energy is already proving to be larger job creation engine than the heavily subsidized fossil-fuels sector, putting Americans back to work in a lackluster economy. 2. Across a range of clean energy projects, including renewable energy, transit, and energy efficiency, for every million dollars spent, 16.7 green jobs are created. That is over three times the 5.3 jobs per million dollars that are created from the same spending on fossil-fuel industries. 3. The clean energy sector is growing at a rate of 8.3 percent. Solar thermal energy expanded by 18.4 percent annually from 2003 to 2010, along with solar photovoltaic power by 10.7 percent, and biofuels by 8.9 percent over the same period. Meanwhile, the U.S. wind energy industry saw 35 percent average annual growth over the past five years, accounting for 35 percent of new U.S. power capacity in that period, according to the 2010 U.S. Wind Industry Annual Market Report. As a whole, the clean energy sector’s average growth rate of 8.3 percent annually during this period was nearly double the growth rate of the overall economy during that time. 4. The production of cleaner cars and trucks is employing over 150,000 workers across the United States today. These job numbers are likely to increase as improved car and light truck standards recently announced by President Barack Obama will require more skilled employees and encourage further investment. 5. Median wages are 13 percent higher in green energy careers than the economy average. Median salaries for green jobs are $46,343, or about $7,727 more than the median wages across the broader economy. As an added benefit, nearly half of these jobs employ workers with a less than a four-year college degree, which accounts for a full 70 percent of our workforce. 6. Green jobs are made in America, spurring innovation with more U.S. content than other industries. Most of the products used in energy efficiency retrofits are more than 90 percent made in America. Sheet metal for ductwork is over 99 percent domestically sourced, as are vinyl windows (98 percent) and rigid foam insulation (more than 95 percent). Even major mechanical equipment such as furnaces (94 percent) and air conditioning and heat pumps (82 percent) are predominantly American made. 7. We have a positive trade balance in solar power components such as photovoltaic components and solar heating and cooling components of $1.9 billion, and are exporting components to China. Contrast this with the oil industry, where in 2010 alone we imported over $250 billion in petroleum-related products. As our nation’s basic manufacturing base declines, we risk losing our place in the forefront of innovation if we don’t invest in advanced manufacturing in the green sector. 8. Three separate programs for energy efficiency retrofits have employed almost 25,000 Americans in three months. The Weatherization Assistance Program, Energy Efficiency Block Grant Program, and State Energy Programs have collectively upgraded over half a million buildings since the programs began to ramp up from April 1, 2011 and June 30, 2011, providing immediate new and sustainable job opportunities to tens of thousands of construction workers eagerly searching for work. 9. Clean energy jobs are better for U.S. small businesses. Specialty construction companies that perform energy retrofits show very high rates of small business participation in the construction. Ninety-one percent of the firms involved in retrofits are mall businesses with less than 20 employees. 10. An abundance of jobs in the green sector are manufacturing jobs with an upward career track. Forty-one percent of the nation’s green jobs offer medium to long-term career building and training opportunities, and 26 percent of green jobs are in the manufacturing sector, compared to 9 percent in the traditional economy. The bottom line: Green jobs being created through smart investments in our energy infrastructure are expanding employment opportunities while reducing pollution of our air and water, providing an alternative to foreign oil, and allowing us to export more American-made goods abroad.

### A2: CP Illegitimate

#### ---Literature-the counterplan is identified as an important and competitive option in the energy literature. Its predictable and a germane policy option.

American Energy Innovation Council ‘11

Catalyzing Ingenuity Chapter 3

<http://americanenergyinnovation.org/catalyzing-ingenuity-chapter-3/>

Domestic Energy Production

The U.S. has an abundance of natural resources, including sizable oil and natural gas reserves. The energy sector is an enormous revenue generator for the government, which collects a variety of taxes and fees from the many companies that produce, refine, and deliver energy to consumers and businesses. Going forward, any expansion of domestic production offers an opportunity to reevaluate the revenue sharing associated with the extraction of U.S. natural resources.

With continued, and likely expanded, off-shore oil and gas exploration, shale gas production on federal lands, and enhanced oil recovery in the coming years, reorienting a portion of the current suite of domestic energy production fees - including royalty payments, lease sales, bonus bids and other charges - presents a real opportunity to raise new revenue for the federal government that could fund innovation in new energy technologies.

### A2: Certainty

#### ---Turn---the counterplan is a political “sweet-spot” that creates a supportive political climate for oil and gas production.

Muro-Brookings-1/25/12

<http://www.brookings.edu/up-front/posts/2012/01/25-sotu-energy-muro-fikri>

The Missing Link in the State of the Union Energy Agenda

It was good to hear strong shout-outs for clean and renewable energy sourcing as part of the balanced energy stance promoted in President Obama’s State of the Union speech this week. We’ve long agreed that the “all of the above” energy approach Obama championed last night could be desirable so long as it is just that—oriented to the balanced development of all sources including American renewable and clean energy as well as fossil fuel resources. In that nexus lies a politically defensible sweet-spot notwithstanding the tough politics of the energy debate. And yet, the president left out a crucial link in his renewed commitments to both clean energy and increased conventional energy: He missed the opportunity to tie the revenues from fossil fuel drilling permits and licenses to investment in energy innovation. In this respect, a truly potent “all of the above” stance would move to link reasonable continued fossil fuel exploitation to investments in the innovation necessary to accelerate the widespread adoption of clean new energy technologies. Along these lines, a smart “all of the above” approach to the nation’s energy challenges might channel the royalties and fees associated with increased off-shore and inland fossil fuel extraction into programs like ARPA-e, the Energy Innovation Hubs, or more generally into basic and applied clean energy research and deployment. And as it happens, such a linkage once had (and may again garner!) bipartisan support. After all, not so long ago Rep. John Boehner (R-OH), now speaker, introduced the House Republicans’ American Energy Act of 2009 and in it proposed a bargain that would have paired expanded oil and gas drilling with new investments in renewable and alternative energy. The bill proposed putting hundreds of billions of anticipated new oil and gas revenues (and that even before the shale gas boom) into a trust fund to accelerate clean energy innovation. The upshot: For a few fleeting months that broad outline pointed to an intriguing way forward. Now, maybe that grand trade beckons again. Yet to make it a truly productive agreement the Obama team needs to remember that “all of the above” should entail a true trade. Here is hoping that the forthcoming elaboration of the new stance backs up the president’s stated commitments with a commonsense proposal for linking stepped-up fossil fuel extraction to revenue-raising for investments in new and cleaner energy technologies.

#### ---Turn-Failure to engage in the consultative process triggers congressional backlash that will undermine implementation of the plan

Collier-Congressional Research Service-83

(Ellen C.-, Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy @ the Congressional Research Service, *Foreign Affairs Committee Print*, P. 72)

For the most part, consultation is not an end in itself but a means toward building an effective policy. Nevertheless, consultation itself may be an objective to the extent that it represents a satisfactory working relationship between two branches constituting a mutual recognition that each branch has a legitimate role to play in foreign policy. Certainly the cost of lack of adequate consultation has an occasion proved extremely high in terms of impairing relations. Failure of the Nixon administration to consult with Congress during the crisis in Cyprus in 1974 contributed to the decision of Congress to impose the Turkish arms embargo in 1975. Unilateral announcement by the Carter administration at the end of 1978 that it was terminating the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan added to tension between the branches that led to a court suit. Congress responded to an executive branch decision to vote for U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia by passing a law prohibiting the United States from complete compliance with the sanctions. With little consultation taking place, there were 14 years of legislative-executive tension on the Rhodesia issue.

#### ---Negotiations will be quick

Koh**-**Prof. of Poli Sci and Former Dean @ Yale-90 *The National Security Constitution*

I reject the notion that more intense legal scrutiny of executive decision would necedsarily foster presidential paralsis when world events demand a prompt response. Most foreign-policy decisions are implemented over the course of months and years, not moments. Excepting, perhaps, a response to a nuclear strikem the occasions are exceedingly rare when the president would jeopardize the nation by considering legality before committig the nation to a course of intentional action. Nor can I accept that requiring the president to act lawfully would confine him or her to conducting foreign poicy through inefficient, existing cabinet bureaucracies. As the Cuban missile and the Iranian hostage crises illustrated, presidents can quickly respond to pressing interational crisies, even through ad hoc nonbureaucratic channels, without offending core constutional principles or forgoing the expert advice of legal counsel.

# 1NR – Energy Politics K

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### Overview

#### , failing to challenge the political structure of global energy production and consumption causes global war.

Byrne & Toly 2006

John, director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (CEEP) and Distinguished Professor of Public Policy at the University of Delaware, Noah, research associate and Ph.D. candidate in the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy at the University of Delaware, Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse, *Transforming Power: Energy, Environment and Society in Conflict*, pg

 Remaining modern, however, also demands an increasing commitment to override what lags behind from a modernist point of view. The bottomless wells to which Huber and Mills refer are increasingly found among the most vulnerable ecologies and communities, and their sacrifice to deliver more energy also involves the geological scale refinement of physical formations, biological scale modification of evolution, and historical scale alteration of social relations. A recent advertisement by Occidental Petroleum blends modernist ideology with the hubris of modern management as “Oxy brings energy to energy solutions” (Occidental Petroleum Corporation, 2005): Oxy is on the cutting edge in using advanced techniques to maximize the recovery of oil and natural gas worldwide. Energy is the lifeblood of the sustainable development process that is critical to overcoming poverty and raising living standards. And we’re working hard to meet the world’s ever growing demand for reliable energy supplies. While the company imagines energy as the lifeblood of progress, the U’wa people in Colombia, on whose lands the oil envied by Occidental Petroleum resides, describe it as the lifeblood of “Mother Earth.” Oil extraction would represent the slow death of both ecology and culture for the U’wa (J. T. Roberts and Thanos, 2003; Lee, forthcoming). In addition to a disregard for cultural continuity in traditional and indigenous communities, extending the capacity to exploit fossil fuels through modernization of the conventional energy regime carries an additional requirement. As Michael Klare (2004, 2006) indicates, continued dependence upon oil, coupled with diminishing supplies and increasing demand, is likely to mean increased global conflict. The same can be said of natural gas (Klare, 2002b: 81 - 108). An industrialized world moored to the conventional energy regime will, in all likelihood, force further needs to militarize its operations.

#### ---This violence comparatively outweighs the aff in terms of both magnitude and probability --- Collapse of the political makes enmity invisible and genocidal.

Reinhard 2004

Kenneth, UCLA, Towards a Political-Theology of the Neighbor (Draft), Google Cache

If the concept of the political is defined, as Carl Schmitt does, in terms of the Enemy/Friend opposition, the world we find ourselves in today is one from which the political may have already disappeared, or at least has mutated into some strange new shape. A world not anchored by the “us” and “them” binarisms that flourished as recently as the Cold War is one subject to radical instability, both subjectively and politically, as Jacques Derrida points out in The Politics of Friendship: The effects of this destructuration would be countless: the ‘subject’ in question would be looking for new reconstitutive enmities; it would multiply ‘little wars’ between nation-states; it would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or genocidal struggles; it would seek to pose itself, to find repose, through opposing still identifiable adversaries – China, Islam? Enemies without which … it would lose its political being … without an enemy, and therefore without friends, where does one then find oneself, qua a self? (PF 77) If one accepts Schmitt’s account of the political, the disappearance of the enemy results in something like global psychosis: since the mirroring relationship between Us and Them provides a form of stablility, albeit one based on projective identifications and repudiations, the loss of the enemy threatens to destroy what Lacan calls the “imaginary tripod” that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-subjectivity, until something causes it to collapse, resulting in full-blown delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia. Hence, for Schmitt, a world without enemies is much more dangerous than one where one is surrounded by enemies; as Derrida writes, the disappearance of the enemy opens the door for “an unheard-of violence, the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its unprecedented – therefore monstrous – forms; a violence in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable” (PF 83).

### A2 Framework --- 2nc Energy Alt

#### ---Framing determines policy effectiveness --- 90% of policy errors emerge from the flawed and deterministic lens of security.

Lowth 2011

Colonel R. G., British Army, ‘Securitization’ and its effect on Strategic Thinking, SEAFORD HOUSE PAPER, Royal Defense Studies

A frame is ‘a perspective from which a problematic situation can be made sense of’.4 Framing sets a particular context. It shapes perceptions, and influences thinking and behaviour (Haider-Markel et al, 2006; Bradley, 2011).5 The re-framing of issues (ie. ‘reinterpreting their meaning and re-perceiving the situation’ (ibid)) is also potentially transformative.6 Much mistaken thinking and associated flawed behaviour is attributed, with authority, to mis-perception: ‘Around 90% of errors in thinking ... arise from errors of perception (Carr, 2010:5).7 Indeed some afford perceptions not just a primary but an exclusive explanatory role: ‘Perception is all there is’ (Peters and Austin, 1994:71). The ways in which problems are articulated and interpreted, in terms of their essential ‘form or origin’, fundamentally affects the strategies developed to resolve them (Goffman, 1986:10). The process of framing influences strategic thinking because it shapes a priori understanding, organisation and explanation: ‘Problems arise as much from the meaning that people involved give them as from the facts of the situation’ (Martin, 2002:28). Framed thinking is inherently convergent, focused and directed as if by a lens, but the process is neither objective nor universal; it varies between individuals and communities, and alters over time. Framing involves (re)definition. Words are critical and their impact, albeit invariably subconscious, can be profound: ‘There is nothing outside the text’ (Derrida, 1976:158). The cognitive linguist George Lakoff challenged his students not to think of an elephant – but none could avoid doing so. The word alone created an irresistible frame: Every word, like elephant, evokes a frame, which can be an image or other kinds of knowledge ... the word is defined relative to that frame (Lakoff, 2004:3). Framing is more than just associative, however; it also tends to be partial: When the word tax is added to relief, the result is a metaphor: Taxation is an affliction, the person who takes it away is a hero, and anyone who tries to stop him is a bad guy. This is a frame ... made up of ideas, like affliction and hero (ibid). Moreover, framing – as a form of linguistic construction – can be purposefully partial: Framing is about language that fits your worldview, [but] it is not just language. Ideas are primary — and the language carries those ideas, evokes those ideas (ibid). The language of security is similarly evocative, partial and inherently political. The theory of securitization within international relations – the use of the term ‘security’ to elevate an issue above and beyond normal politics – is remarkably similar to that of framing: The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure ... the staging of existential issues as of supreme priority. The process ... a speech-act ... causes the actor to operate in a different mode than he would have otherwise (Buzan et al, 1998:26,30). Both the generic process of framing and the specific example of securitization: ‘construct discourses through which the world comes to be perceived’ (Henry, 2002:68). They are both potentially powerful forms of sense-making. And yet, curiously, the two are seldom connected explicitly.8 Debates about securitisation are conducted within the milieu of security studies; they tend to focus on how issues become characterised as threats, rather than on the ramifications. Those concerned about framing, on the other hand, operating principally within psychology and its fields of application (behavioural sciences, sociology, media studies etc) tend to address much more keenly the cognitive implications, especially the creation of alternative world views, the colouring of perceptions, and associated influences on decision-making. This paper draws upon both fields of research to explore the framing effect of securitization on strategic thinking.9 Starting from the premise that: ‘By saying the word [security], something is done’ (Wæver, 1995:55), it is argued that: − (A part of) what securitization – as a form of discourse – ‘does’, is frame − In the context of strategy, this matters (so strategists should be aware). thinking. − A conscious process of de-securitization can re-frame thinking (with potentially beneficial results). The increasing breadth of affairs portrayed as ‘security issues’ – food, water, the environment, as well as energy – makes it imperative, in an ‘era of security obsessionism’ (Charrett, 2009:11), for policy makers and strategists to appreciate the cognitive influence of securitization. However, while both framing and securitization are periodically characterised as negative, this dissertation makes no such judgment – either in general, or in relation to European energy supply. The intention here is to demonstrate instead that securitization does frame strategic thinking, and that this matters: ‘Designating an issue as a matter of security is not just a theoretical question but caries ‘real-world’ significance’ (Hough, 2004:14).

#### ---Energy policy scenario planning disconnects us from the realities of status quo consumption and distracts from material change.

Sumrell & Varnelis 2009

Robert, production designer, educator, writer & teaches at the Columbia University Graduate School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation, Kazys, Director of the Network Architecture Lab at the Columbia University Graduate School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation, Personal Lubricants: Shell Oil and Scenario Planning, New Geographies 2: Landscapes of Energy, pg 131-132

Scenario planning does not focus on the future but rather on the present. Peak oil, global warming, and the fragility of speculative bubbles are imminent threats. But the massive capital already invested by companies like Shell in existing infrastructure makes it impossible for them to abandon standard industry practices, even if they know that the consequences of business as usual will be dire once things hit a tipping point. Like fairy tales, scenarios present carefully crafted stories that indirectly illustrate the dangers of the world to an audience that isn't ready for them. They allow us to prepare for the future, even if we feel powerless against the forces of the world around us, by providing a context for speaking about the unspeakable. The lessons of fairy tales are gentle and distant, they may only make sense later, when the codified dangers from the stories appear in reality. This helps preserve a childlike naiveté and enables the continued drive toward pleasure in the face of fear and doubt. As Bruno Bettelheim wrote: "The figures and events of fairy tales also personify and illustrate inner conflicts, but they suggest ever so subtly how these conflicts may be solved, and what the next steps in the development toward a higher humanity might be. The fairy tale is presented in a simple, homely way; no demands are made on the listener. This prevents even the smallest child from feeling compelled to act in specific ways, and he is never made to feel inferior. Far from making demands, the fairy tale reassures, gives hope for the future, and holds out the promise of a happy ending." By providing a forum where fear and anxiety can both be discussed, fairy tales provide listeners with a sense of importance, even if they do not yet have agency.46 ln Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Sigmund Freud hypothesized that since organisms come into being from a plenum of inanimate matter, they carry with them the death drive or "pleasure principle” a desire to return to this undifferentiated state. lf, however, the organism responds with an "influx of fresh amounts of stimulus" through a traumatic event, it can awake again and go on living or, if the stimulus is strong enough, reproduce.4T In this light, scenario planning functions more as a rhetorical device and therapy than as a method of planning or accurate forecast. The shock of the actual event is necessary to allow change to occur. But scenario planning allows participants to continue playing even though they know better. Like psychoanalysis, there is no end or goal to the process of gaming; its value is the sensation that comes from playing the game.

### 2NC A2: Methodology

#### Makes solvency impossible --- Failure to politicize energy security naturalizes inequality sparking localistic, nationalist and religious backlash. Instead of promoting “energy security” we need to ask “energy security for who?”

Hildyard Lohmann & Sexton 2012

Nicholas, founder and Director of The Corner House, Larry, author of the book “Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power” & works at the British NGO The Corner House, Sarah, a director of The Corner House, Energy Security For What? For Whom? The Corner House, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/energy-security-whom-what

One of the ironies of upper-case Energy Security is that it is unavoidably insecure. Because its logic dictates a certain indifference to lowercase “securities”, its reign will always be conditioned by opposition: from those dispossessed by oil extraction to those impoverished by dam construction, made ill by power plant pollution or enslaved on agrofuel plantations. And the more extended and invasive a militarised energy system becomes, the more flavours of resistance and refusal it will provoke from communities obeying different logics: localistic, nationalistic, religious. Thus even the conversion of a “temporary” US military base in Saudi Arabia to a permanent one on the grounds that the kingdom was a target for Saddam Hussein formed part of the indictment Osama bin Laden issued in his call to arms against the West.77 By the same token, the more that an energy system is subjected to centralised control – that is, the more Securely it is placed in the hands of a few corporations or ministries – the more openings there are for accidents, storms78 or the activities of energy traders or saboteurs to wreak havoc on giant generation plants, interconnected transmission lines, pipelines and waterways. “Risk spreading” through increased interconnection and “tight coupling” among elements of the system paradoxically opens yet more vulnerabilities.79 As geographer Mazen Labban explains: “the vulnerability of the network derives not only from its vastness . . . of the (physical) concentration of the infrastructure, but also from its connectivity: disruption of supply in one place might create shocks at the regional, or even global scale.”80 One insecurity recently talked up involves the potentially “catastrophic consequences” of a cyber-attack on power plants and the electricity grid. The effects, it is said, would be equivalent to “the cumulative toll of 50 major hurricanes ripping into the nation simultaneously”.81 Proposed European Union “smart grids” with “intelligent metering and monitoring systems”82 making possible instant feedback between consumers’ energy use rates and the actions of generators magnify such “cyber-security” and data protection challenges. The growing commodification of Security only adds to these contradictions. As Security evolves into a marketed product, it becomes increasingly opposed to Security itself. The reason is simple. As a commodity, Security tends to become whatever the Security market produces. But what a system of commodified Security produces above all is numbers, because Security products tend to be assessed for their quantitative efficiency: for example, so many kills per unit of money, energy or labour expended. Diminishing returns then set in. The increased production and accumulation of Security becomes of less and less use in dealing with the political and other human realities that must also be faced by any attempt to maintain Security. (It also, of course, tends to be at odds with any systematic defence of lower-case “securities”.) Thus even the overwhelming “shock and awe” piled on to the initial US attack on Iraq was unable to prevent the war from eventually costing 50 times more than predicted84 and dragging on for years, just as the Viet Nam War “kill ratio” of 19 dead Vietnamese to one dead US soldier was powerless to forestall an eventual US defeat. Most people need only to be asked the question to realise that few of the hundreds of billions of dollars being spent today on Security are in the end making anyone safer. If security is “scarce”, accumulation of more Security is only making it more so.

### 2NC A2: Perm

####  (\_\_) Critical Energy Crisis --- Framing their advantages in terms of impending energy doom safeguards the illusion that once we resolve <> we can go back business as usual levels of energy consumption. Their emphasis on timeframe and a need for immediate action is a scare tactic designed to stifle deliberation over anything except how to maintain the status quo.

Illich 1974

Ivan, Austrian philosopher, Roman Catholic priest, and "maverick social critic" of the institutions of contemporary western culture, *Energy and Equity*, http://worldstreets.wordpress.com/2010/09/29/energy-and-equity-ivan-illich/

It has recently become fashionable to insist on an impending energy crisis. This euphemistic term conceals a contradiction and consecrates an illusion. It masks the contradiction implicit in the joint pursuit of equity and industrial growth. It safeguards the illusion that machine power can indefinitely take the place of manpower. To resolve this contradiction and dispel this illusion, it is urgent to clarify the reality that the language of crisis obscures: high quanta of energy degrade social relations just as inevitably as they destroy the physical milieu. The advocates of an energy crisis believe in and continue to propagate a peculiar vision of man. According to this notion, man [sic] is born into perpetual dependence on slaves which he [sic] must painfully learn to master. If he [sic] does not employ prisoners, then he [sic] needs machines to do most of his [sic] work. According to this doctrine, the well-being of a society can be measured by the number of years its members have gone to school and by the number of energy slaves they have thereby learned to command. This belief is common to the conflicting economic ideologies now in vogue. It is threatened by the obvious inequity, harriedness, and impotence that appear everywhere once the voracious hordes of energy slaves outnumber people by a certain proportion. The energy crisis focuses concern on the scarcity of fodder for these slaves. I prefer to ask whether free men need them.

#### They’re not clean at all – their bridge is ineffective

Conca 2012

James, contributer to forbes, specializes in energy, a Senior Scientist with the RJLee Group, and Director of their Center for Laboratory Sciences in Pasco, WA, Ph.D. in Geochemistry, “Fugitive Methane Caught in the Act of Raising GHG” http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2012/07/15/fugitive-methane-caught-in-the-act-of-raising-ghg/

It may turn out that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are higher from using natural gas to produce electricity than from using coal. Or are they? The possible culprit of these GHG emissions is fugitive emissions of methane. Since methane is a far more potent GHG than CO2, this is bad. Fugitive losses include loss of methane from the well-head during flow-back return of the fluids, during drill-out following fracturing and during well-venting, plus losses from equipment leaks, losses during transport, storage, and distribution, processing losses and losses during liquid unloading. (Is methane coming out of your faucet fugitive?) Traditionally, we use emission numbers just for the power plant itself, that is, how much CO2 does a coal plant emit in producing a kWhr of electricity versus a gas plant versus a wind turbine, etc. These numbers have some emissions from other parts of the plant life-cycle such as construction and mining, as these dominate the emissions for energy sources like nuclear, hydro and wind which emit no GHG during operation. Until now, the average equivalent grams of CO2 emitted per kWhr produced has been calculated as 975 gCO2/kWhr from coal; 600 gCO2/kWhr from natural gas; 90 gCO2/kWhr from hydro; 55 gCO2/kWhr from solar; 15 gCO2/kWhr from wind, and 15 gCO2/kWhr from nuclear (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology; GHG from Power Plants). And that may be correct. However, new studies by Robert Howarth and associates at Cornell University (GHG Footprint of Natural Gas; National Climate Assessment; thanks to atomikrabbit for pointing me in this direction) provide emissions data from the entire natural gas life-cycle. Their results bump this number for gas from 600 gCO2/kWhr to over 1,200 gCO2/kWhr, making natural gas the largest emitter of GHGs in electricity generation. On the other hand, Howarth and company have been challenged by others that say their numbers are too high (BusinessWeek), particularly Lawrence M. Cathles, also of Cornell. Cathles contends that gas is still better than coal with respect to global warming. Even if Cathles is correct and 600 gCO2/kWhr is still the number for gas, it’s not that much better than coal compared to ther energy sources like hydro and nuclear. Methane is a powerful GHG, with a global warming potential that is twenty times greater than that of carbon dioxide. However, this effect is time-dependent – it matters when the gas is emitted and how long it stays in the atmosphere, and that is part of the controversy. Methane effects peak over the first two decades following emission, and this is the exact time frame in which we need to act in revamping our energy mix. Escape of these fugitives is especially large for shale gas as it requires high-volume hydraulic fracturing, or fracking. Fracking forces large volumes of water under pressure into the shale to fracture and re-fracture the rock to increase gas flow. A large amount of this water returns to the surface as flow-back within the first weeks after injection, bringing back large quantities of methane. These losses can be decreased if new technologies are used and if regulations are strengthened (EPA 2010) like using smart automated plunger lifts during liquid unloading, use of flash-tank separators or vapor recovery units, better storage tanks and compressors, and better leak detetors. Such improvements have resulted in lower emissions from gas production in Colorado versus those in Utah, but these methods are not yet being broadly implemented and it is up to individual States to act. It is still true that gas does not have the nasty health effects that result from breathing burnt coal particulates, hazardous compounds emitted like mercury and lead, the air quality issues from NOx and SOx, and the environmental effects from mining. So coal is not off the hook for these problems. But we have to expand the non-fossil fuel sources quickly if we are to address global warming in any meaningful way .If true in any sense, these new numbers for gas could become even more important if carbon-trading or C-taxing occurs as these schemes presently undervalue the warming effects of methane and the emissions from unconventional gas sources like shales and tight-sands. Many think we are destined to become a natural gas nation because natural gas is considered a bridge fuel from oil and coal to the non-fossil fuels. Beware – this bridge may still get too hot before we reach the other side.

### 2NC ALT

#### ---The alternative is to re-politicize energy policy shifting the focus away from production in favor of mutually exclusive competing visions of life. Increasing energy production cannot reform structural inequalities. Only challenging seemingly innocuous concepts like [energy/security] can prevent globalization from becoming a bloodbath.

Flipo 2008

Fabrice, Energy: prometheus bound or unbound? A conceptual approach, SAPIENS, 1.2 | 2008 : Vol.1 / n°2,

http://sapiens.revues.org/248

In the end, the problem is not so much to liberate or chain Prometheus as it is to stop believing in the myth of humanity as homo faber with its warehouse of materials affirming a predetermined future that will be glorious for all. This myth prevents us from seeing the real issues. Growth does not automatically lead to progress for everyone and the reasons for this have been known for a long time. As shown by Ivan Illich (Illich, 1973), they concern the materiality of the human condition, which is reaffirmed today in the ecological world view. The development that is taking place can only benefit a minority of the world’s population; it is therefore urgent to rethink the energy issue in this context, rather than by sector or in a reductionist manner. Energy is the fire that brings machines to life. Without it, there would be no armies of mechanical slaves or non-unionized workers working relentlessly, day after day, without complaining. There would remain only physical power and energy derived from the sun, wind, biomass, etc. There is no energy source that is clean, free or unlimited. They all give rise to some disadvantages that may be more or less serious or irreversible. Knowing who will be subjected to these disadvantages is as important as knowing who will benefit from the advantages, or if these advantages will increase at a given point in time. Machines are not necessarily useful: although they can reduce fatigue and suffering, they can also increase the production of weapons, become the source of destruction or be used to serve the interests of only a few. The real issue is to rethink the common good. It is clear that economic growth alone is leading us down the path to ruin. The trends described by trend scenarios are clear and support one another (WEC, 2000; UNPD, 2000). Unless various technological miracles are expected to occur—which, once again will be the responsibility of future generations—the world is headed for serious crises. The issue is not the standard of living or comfort levels: numerous scenarios have shown that it is technically possible to attain a comfortable standard of living without compromising the well-being of others5. Places such as Sri Lanka or Kerala, in India, have attained very high levels of well-being while having a very minimal impact on the environment (cf. Figure 1). Mechanization no longer frees humanity from work. The effort expended today is for the most part devoted to the production of disposable objects or the creation of extra needs. This, in fact, has been the justification for putting human beings to work. We no longer have time for anything; everything moves too fast; we never stop running from one job to the next, never stop producing, consuming, filling out papers, etc. Other cultures have generally worked much less than ours, considering that their economic needs were met, as was shown by anthropologist Marshall Sahlins (Sahlins, 1976). Truly, the issue lies elsewhere. We must explore new avenues of cooperation founded on sharing and the recognition of others and not on exploitation and consumption. This leads to the questioning of the meaning of life for individuals and for communities: do we really need everything that we consume? Are we prepared to pay the price for our unrestrained over-consumption: police state, global apartheid, conflicts, ecological imbalances, etc.? Or do we want another world for ourselves? If that is the case, the creation of this other world starts with individuals: we must initiate the changes we would like to see take place in the world. Reducing our consumption means working less; it means taking part in the creation of a world that is more just and more united. As Gandhi once said, “There is enough on this earth to meet everyone’s need but not everyone’s greed.” The issue of needs must therefore be brought up once again, before the appetite of a few ends up devouring everyone else. This particularly involves raising questions about human nature. Yes, we must speak out forcefully against Bush and his consorts; justice requires that we assert that “our way of life is negotiable”. This must be done to prevent globalization from turning into a bloodbath. Homo economicus, whohas an insatiable appetite, is a fiction who has become dangerous. Progress no longer entails producing and consuming; it involves building sustainable societies that live in harmony with their natural environment. The means necessary to achieve this are stated in the triptych “moderation, energy efficiency and renewable energy”6 and are at the service of justice. This is not a question of GDP points, but rather, an issue concerning civilization.